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Article
Tax Compliance and Norm Formation
Under High-Penalty Regimes
SUSAN C. MORSE
Skepticism about the potential of moral appeals relating to tax compliance-
for example, as applied to large groups of individual taxpayers outside a wartime
context-has resulted in the absence of a theory about how government
communication can further tax compliance. This Article fills that gap. It provides
a theory of tax compliance and norm formation under high-penalty regimes from
the starting point of a noncompliance norm.
The theory explains the roles of and mutually reinforcing relationships
between, the compliance mechanisms of deterrence, separation, and reputation
signaling. The success of these mechanisms depends on the presence of (i)
taxpayer perception of penalty imposition, (ii) taxpayer perception of detection
efficacy, and (iii) an absence of close substitutes. Either government enforcement
or a reputation market can provide penalty imposition and detection efficacy. This
Article offers the U.S. requirement of self-reporting of offshore bank account
information as an example of a potentially effective high-penalty regime founded
on aggressive and creative government enforcement efforts.
The theory also defines an appropriate role for expressive law in advancing
tax compliance. This role has relevance, at least, when resources have been
committed and government enforcement is not practical. The theory suggests that
using law to define good-reputation indicators has particular promise when
applied to reputation-sensitive taxpayers such as large intermediaries. This
Article identifies four expressive law tax compliance tactics: reputation
referencing, salience, management targeting, and incrementalism. It illustrates
the expressive law portion of the theory with the example ofFATCA, a law passed
in 2010 that will require non-US. banks to identify U.S. account holders or face
withholding on certain U.S. investment returns.
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Tax Compliance and Norm Formation
Under High-Penalty Regimes
SUSAN C. MORSE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Scholars disagree about how the government can influence compliance
with the law, including tax compliance. Under a view that takes seriously
the assumption that taxpayers are rational economic decision-makers, the
government can influence compliance mainly by increasing or enforcing
penalties. This view has its roots in the theory of deterrence. The
government may also provide opportunities for compliant taxpayers to
self-identify as such. This can separate compliant from noncompliant
taxpayers, boosting government's ability to tailor enforcement solutions to
each.
Under another view, the government's statements and actions have an
expressive function and can provide content for compliance norms
enforced by informal sanctions. This view connects to the idea of
reputational signaling. In the tax context, the use of expressive law lacks
broad support, and the connection between expressive law and deterrence
has not yet been fully explored.
This Article provides a theory of tax compliance under high-penalty
regimes. The theory accommodates both the strict rational economic actor
view and the expressive law view; explains the roles of and mutually
reinforcing relationships between deterrence, separation, and signaling;
and defines an appropriate role for expressive law in advancing tax
compliance. The example of offshore accounts is used to illustrate the
theory.
Parts II and III of this Article set forth an analytic framework for
analyzing high-penalty tax regimes where there is no strong pre-existing
compliance norm. Part II outlines the compliance mechanisms of
deterrence, separation, and signaling and describes their mutually
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reinforcing relationships. Part III argues that three supports are necessary
for a high-penalty regime to implement successfully one or more of these
compliance mechanisms. Taxpayers should (i) perceive that they actually
face material penalties for noncompliance, (ii) believe that the government
has an effective mechanism for detecting noncompliers who attempt to
masquerade as compliers, and (iii) lack close-substitute choices not subject
to penalties. Either government enforcement or a reputational market can
provide perceived penalties and detection of masquerading noncompliers.
Part IV theorizes the problem presented where government
enforcement cannot provide the supports of perceived penalties and
masquerading noncomplier detection. It argues that an expressive law
strategy may be capable of triggering a tax compliance norm that then can
support a full set of the three compliance mechanisms of signaling,
separation, and deterrence. This strategy has particular promise when
applied to large tax intermediaries that are reputdtion-sensitive, participate
in a robust reputation market, and have the opportunity to signal publicly
their tax compliance behavior.
Parts V, VI, and VII use the problem of offshore account information
asymmetry to illustrate the analytic framework developed in Parts II, III,
and IV. Part V explains that some U.S. persons transfer funds to financial
accounts outside the United States and fail to include related items in their
reported taxable income. Part V also describes how the multinational
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") used
an expressive law strategy in this context to persuade countries to take
certain steps toward information exchange and transparency and to remove
themselves from the so-called tax haven "blacklist."
Part VI applies the analytic framework developed in Parts II, III, and
IV to the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts ("FBAR")
requirements that oblige U.S. taxpayers to disclose their offshore account
information to the U.S. government. It argues that government
enforcement can provide the three supports necessary for the FBAR system
to function as an effective high-penalty regime. Key elements include the
government's creative and aggressive publicity of successful audits and its
persuasive anchoring on willfulness-based penalties despite the uncertain
applicability of such penalties under the Cheek standard.
Part VII applies the analytic framework to the Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act ("FATCA"), which will require foreign financial
intermediaries, such as foreign banks, to report automatically U.S. account
holders' ownership of offshore accounts to the U.S. government.
Noncompliance with FATCA requirements carries high potential penalties,
but the United States, as a practical matter, will not directly enforce it.
FATCA may, however, find success if policymakers use an expressive law
norm development strategy. In particular, one immediate goal of the U.S.
policymakers implementing FATCA should be to persuade non-U.S. banks
[Vol. 44:675
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that compliance with FATCA signals good reputation. This expressive law
strategy would also permit a parallel pursuit of other nations' cooperation
in order to enable government enforcement.
II. COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS OF HIGH-PENALTY REGIMES
A. Assumptions
1. Pre-Existing Noncompliance Norm
This Article examines situations in which a high-penalty regime faces
a pre-existing norm of noncompliance. In the case of tax compliance, it is
often true in situations of interest that a noncompliance norm exists. U.S.
taxpayers have a high rate of income tax compliance,' but it does not
follow that U.S. taxpayers have strong voluntary compliance norms. Most
U.S. taxpayers have no choice but to comply: their taxable income is
automatically withheld upon or at least automatically reported to the
2government. The difficult compliance questions relate to taxpayers who
have the ability to evade tax. This category includes cash business owners
and the group that is the focus of Parts V, VI, and VII of this Article-
holders of offshore financial accounts. For these taxpayers, tax evasion is
commonplace and the norm is, or at least historically has been, at a
noncompliance equilibrium.3
In addition to having practical importance, pre-existing noncompliance
norms provide an analytically attractive starting point. The pre-existing
noncompliance norm features a low compliance baseline, and so the
enactment, or increased enforcement, of a high-penalty regime might have
a material positive effect on compliance. It would be more difficult to
theorize about a high-penalty regime applied to, say, individual wages,
because the tax compliance rate for such income already approaches one
hundred percent.4
2. Legal Certainty
This Article also intends to analyze situations where the law is clear, as
it largely is in the offshore account example used to illustrate the theory
i In 2001, the U.S. compliance rate was about eighty-four percent when measured as the ratio of
the tax paid voluntarily and on time to the total tax due. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, A
COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE TAx GAP 5 (2006), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/comprehensive-strategy.pdf (showing gross tax gap and net tax gap
figures).
2 See, e.g., Susan Cleary Morse, Stewart Karlinsky & Joseph Bankman, Cash Businesses and Tax
Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 37, 39 (2009) ("Taxpayers report cash income less accurately than
income subject to third party reporting and/or withholding.").
3 For example, Schedule C small-business taxpayers have a noncompliance rate of about fifty
percent. Id.
4 See id. (reporting that the evasion rate on wage income is about one percent).
2012)
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developed here.5 Introducing legal uncertainty complicates the analysis,
for example by raising the possibility that actions taken by governments or
others may affect taxpayers' understanding of the degree of certainty of a
certain legal result. There is a lively debate about the impact of legal
uncertainty on the design of tax penalties, 6 but this Article does not mean
to engage it.
3. High Penalties
This Article focuses on high-penalty regimes because such regimes are
prominent relative to, for example, the interest and time-based penalty
regimes generally applicable to underpayments of tax. High penalties are
either criminal penalties or punitively high civil penalties that could exceed
the amount of tax due several times over. Each of the compliance
mechanisms described relies on perceptions of the regime and therefore it
is important that the rules have qualities that make them noticeable and
salient.7 Regimes that feature less severe penalties might also succeed in
achieving the prominence necessary to trigger the described compliance
mechanisms, but consideration of that possibility falls outside the scope of
5 It is true that some questions around the edges of the FBAR and FATCA rules include elements
of uncertainty. It is not perfectly clear whether a court would uphold the legality of large civil
willfulness-based FBAR penalties. See infra Section VI.B. 1. Nor is it clear whether quiet disclosure in
practice cures the failure to file an FBAR. See infra Section VI.B.3. The scope of the financial
institutions subject to FATCA and the details of its due diligence rules also await finalized guidance.
See infra Section VII.C.4. But definitional questions at the margins do not add substantial uncertainty
because this Article focuses on the paradigm case where the FBAR or FATCA requirements plainly do
apply. Moreover, in the case of FATCA, the rules must in practice be relatively clear, as intermediary
banks must translate them into standard operating procedures and clear computer programs. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. §§ 6045, 6049 (2006 & Supp. HI 2010) (outlining the rules for gross proceeds and interest
reporting).6 See, e.g., Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 111, 138
(2009) (arguing that due to the indeterminacy of many tax compliance questions, penalties define
required taxpayer standards of care); Mark P. Gergen, Uncertainty and Tax Enforcement: A Case for
Modest Fault-Based Penalties, 64 TAX L. REV. 453, 472 (2011) (suggesting that legal uncertainty can
cause high penalties to over-deter tax noncompliance among risk-averse taxpayers, while not
sufficiently deterring risk-neutral taxpayers); Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law's
Uncertainty, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1017, 1074 (2009) (summarizing conclusions drawn from the
"subjectivist" view that legal uncertainty relates to taxpayers' beliefs about uncertainty); Kyle D.
Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the Law is Uncertain, 27 VA. TAX REV. 241,
293-96 (2007) (analyzing strict liability and fault-based tax penalty structures assuming legal
uncertainty).
7 Salience, here, is used to mean salience of government or reputational market enforcement,
which can affect compliance decisions. This differs from the broader understanding of salience in the
tax context put forward in other work. Compare Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in
Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 264 (2011) (defining salience as "the degree to which a
tax.., is visible or prominent to the public"), with David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on
Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript
at 2) ("Market salience refers to how tax presentation affects market decisions and economic activity.
Political salience refers to how tax presentation affects voting behavior and political outcomes.").
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this Article.
4. "Taxpayers" Includes Tax Intermediaries
Tax law imposes requirements not only on taxpayers, but also on tax
intermediaries who must report items to the government and/or withhold
tax. Requiring third parties to report or withhold is a variety of gatekeeper
regulation. 8  As Leandra Lederman has argued, a third-party strategy,
including a tax reporting or withholding requirement, is particularly useful
if the third party's reputational, financial, or other interests are aligned with
the government's interest in enforcement. 9
This Article considers the application of high-penalty regimes to tax
intermediaries as well as to taxpayers themselves. In some cases, tax
intermediaries' compliance behavior is more visible than taxpayers'. Also,
tax compliance may provide a stronger reputational signal in the case of
tax intermediaries. Accordingly, the expressive law strategy described in
Part IV and illustrated in Section V.B and Part VII has particular relevance
when applied to intermediaries.
B. Deterrence, Separation, and Signaling
High penalties can increase compliance in several ways. One
mechanism is deterrence. The hypothetical fully rational taxpayer decides
whether to evade tax by comparing the amount of saved tax to the penalties
for cheating weighted by the chance that the evasion will be detected.' 0
Risk aversion modifies this analysis, adding a compliance bias to the fully
rational model." Reputational concerns also modify the cost-benefit
calculus.
12
As Alex Raskolnikov has observed, high penalties can also prompt
8 Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 53, 53-56 (1986) (introducing the gatekeeper regulation concept). This Article does not
mean to consider generally issues and opportunities raised by other gatekeepers such as tax preparers.
9 Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is Information
Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 1733, 1739-41 (2010) [hereinafter Lederman, Reducing
Information Gaps] (listing factors that support a successful information reporting strategy, including
arm's length parties with the capacity to perform the reporting tasks and the absence of "alternative
arrangements"); Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Role Third Parties Play in Tax
Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REv. 695, 734-41 (2007) (outlining reasons for tax authorities to suspect the
quality of the check third parties may provide).
1o See Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J.
PUB. ECON. 323, 326 (1972) (observing initially the implication "that the taxpayer will declare less than
his actual income if the expected tax payment on undeclared income is less than the regular rate").
1 See id. at 327-28 (considering the risk aversion function).
12 See id. at 326-27 (adding reputation to mark "nonpecuniary" considerations in general); James
Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LiT. 818, 850-51 (1998) (noting the likely impact of guilt
and shame on tax compliance decisions); James P. F. Gordon, Individual Morality and Reputation
Costs as Deterrents to Tax Evasion, 33 EUR. ECON. REv. 797 (1989) (modeling tax behavior to include
both an honesty trait and reputation cost).
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self-identification by compliant taxpayers, permitting separation. Self-
identification separates taxpayers into compliant and noncompliant groups
that the government can observe, and to which it can apply different
regimes. The idea is that compliant taxpayers may be more inclined to
self-identify if they know that failing to do so subjects them to the
possibility of high penalties, 13 whether imposed by the government or the
reputation market.
As Eric Posner has explained, tax compliance might also serve as a
reputation signal. For example, a taxpayer's peers may interpret a
compliance choice to connote a reputation-enhancing quality such as
trustworthiness. 14  Signaling connects to deterrence, as suggested above
and explored more fully below, because a rational actor may choose to
provide a compliance signal because of the superior reputational benefits
that result, apart from any moral or altruistic reason for complying.' 5 This
Article distinguishes between, on one hand, reputation; and, on the other
hand, other possible "warm glow" effects such as patriotism or the
satisfaction of contributing to worthy public goods.16  Confining the
purpose of tax compliance signaling to reputation is consistent with
Posner's understanding of signaling.'
7
But this Article does not conceive of a reputation signal as a mark of
"good type" exceptionalism that strengthens if good types are harder to
find. 18 Rather, this Article follows others who have assumed, 19 with some
13 See Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 701-05 (2009) (describing the separation function of penalties).
14 Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781,
1789 (2000).
15 See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18-27 (2000) (exploring the economics-
grounded theory of signaling based in game theory and the problem of distinguishing between good
types and bad types); see generally SOCIAL NORMS, NONLEGAL SANCTIONS, AND THE LAW (Eric A.
Posner ed., 2007) (collecting articles relating to social norms and the law).
16 Compare Robert B. Cialdini, Social Motivations to Comply: Norms, Values and Principles, in 2
TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 200, 209 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T. Scholz
eds., 1989) (suggesting a commitment and consistency link between overarching norms like patriotism
or honesty and tax compliance), and Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Tax Compliance and the Education of
John (and Jane) Q. Taxpayer, 121 TAX NOTES 737, 740-44 (Nov. 10, 2008) (recommending public
education and media tactics to connect tax payment and public goods), with Susan Cleary Morse, Using
Salience and Influence to Narrow the Tax Gap, 40 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 483, 505-06 (2009) (arguing that
small group norms among similar taxpayers have a clearer link to tax compliance than large-group or
national norms).
"7 See Posner, supra note 14, at 1788 (explaining the potential of tax compliance as a good-
reputation signal).
18 POSNER, supra note 15, at 19. Posner's theory could be understood to mean that the rarer good
types are, the harder they are to find and the more powerful the "good type" reputation signal. See id.
19See Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 593 (1998)
(describing an equilibrium shift from less compliance to more compliance as more people comply and
cause others to comply by "punish[ing] wrongdo[ers] by informal means"); see also Alex Geisinger &
Michael Ashley Stein, A Theory of Expressive International Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. 77, 118 (2007)
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empirical support,2 ° that signaling becomes more powerful with a
decreasing proportion of evaders relative to compliers. In other words,
signaling has a virtuous-circle quality: as more people signal compliance as
a positive reputation signal, the positive reputation signal grows in
strength.
Signaling also has a second potential virtuous-circle quality. It can
strengthen the compliance behavior of the taxpayer who signals through
the commitment consistency heuristic. Commitment consistency induces
us to act consistently with past acts and statements, 2' and avoid questions
about "one's reputation for consistency, a highly valued asset in our
economic culture. 22  Nothing limits the operation of commitment
consistency to drive behavior around negative instead of positive norms.
Commitment consistency has the capacity to reinforce the compliance
behavior of a taxpayer who self-identifies as compliant under a signaling
mechanism.
The signaling model can help explain the development of law-breaking
norms as well as compliant norms,23 and, accordingly, noncompliance
might also serve as a "good" reputational signal under some circumstances.
The success of a tax compliance reputation signaling story thus requires a
("As other States are guided by the norm, certainty that a particular behavior is norm-congruent
increases, with a corresponding increase in the esteem a State would expect from acting in accordance
with the norm."); Gordon, supra note 12, at 801 (describing a reputation cost that rises with "the
proportion of the population who are believed to consider evasion to be morally wrong").
20 See, e.g., James Aim & Michael McKee, Tax Compliance as a Coordination Game, 54 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 297, 310-11 (2004) (noting that taxpayer communication regarding planned
noncompliance increases noncompliance and describing ways in which audit policy can discourage
noncompliance cooperation); James Aim et al., Changing the Social Norm of Tax Compliance by
Voting, 52 KYKLOS 141, 153, 161 (1999) (reporting increased compliance if experimental subjects
were permitted to communicate about their compliance decisions); Michael Wenzel, Motivation or
Rationalisation? Causal Relations Between Ethics, Norms and Tax Compliance, 26 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 491, 504-O5 (2005) (reporting longitudinal study results indicating that group norms affect
personal ethics when a taxpayer identifies with the group).
21 See, e.g., ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 59-88 (5th ed. 2009)
(detailing results of commitment consistency studies); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social
Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 358-59 (1997) (noting that the desire to avoid cognitive
dissonance motivates individuals to conform their behavior).
22 Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS 144, 151 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); see also Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The
Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 72 &
n.324 (2004) (arguing that individuals are not aware of the influence that commitment or other
heuristics exert over their decision-making); Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive
Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 522 (2004) ("The central feature of
constraint satisfaction mechanisms is that the mental model will reconfigure itself until the constraints
settle at a point of maximal coherence.").
23 See Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner's Law and Social
Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367, 370-73 (2002) (using "body-piercing, law breaking, or drug use" as
examples).
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reputational market that connects signals of tax compliance to other valued
qualities like honesty or responsibility. Another objection to signaling
theory is the possible suitability of the theory to only "'medium-sized'
communities in which a particular person does not have extensive personal
experience with most potential cooperative partners, but in which it is
plausible that there will be repeated interactions with a given signaler., 24
There is also the concern that the signaler may change his or her mind.25
Finally, signaling faces the problem that it may be impossible to
observe signals. This is a particular problem for tax compliance, as
taxpayers are not generally forced to show publicly whether or not they
comply. 26 This distinguishes tax compliance from a law relating to, say,
water conservation in residential landscaping, where signaling is usually
inevitable and social pressures naturally encourage compliance.
However, some taxpayers are subject to public tax reporting
requirements. Examples include third-party reporting by tax
intermediaries such as banks, pass-through entity reporting by partnerships
and S corporations, and disclosure of tax returns by politicians. Public tax
reporting has greater potential to support a reputation signal if the reporting
audience, perhaps composed of clients or owners, views compliance with
the reporting requirements favorably.
This Article does not mean to claim that signaling always, or even
usually, can work to generate a tax compliance norm. An important
prerequisite for the argument, developed in Part VII, that signaling might
be used to develop a tax compliance norm in the case of the administration
of FATCA, is that the targets of FATCA-large global financial
institutions-operate in a well-functioning reputational market. Large
banks care about their reputation for honesty and responsibility. Their
market constitutes a community where customers need reputation to
choose a bank, with which they will then enter into a series of interactions
and transactions.27 Banks are less likely to change an established signaling
behavior, as it must be woven into the organizational structure, computer
systems, and other standard operating procedures of the bank. Finally,
banks' compliance behavior-such as the sending of annual tax reports to
24 Paul G. Mahoney, Norms and Signals: Some Skeptical Observations, 36 U. RICH. L. REv. 387,
392 (2002).
25 See Elmer K Schaefer, Predicting Defection, 36 U. RICH. L. REv. 443, 447-51 (2002)
(analyzing preference shift possibilities).
26 Taxpayer confidentiality and the ability to settle claims with the government often conceal tax
compliance and noncompliance signals. See, e.g., Doran, supra note 6, at 135-38 (noting that norm
development theory generally fits poorly with tax compliance); Eric A. Posner, The Signaling Model of
Social Norms: Further Thoughts, 36 U. RICH. L. REv. 465, 468 (2002) (noting the difficulty of
demonstrating tax compliance).
27 See, e.g., infra Section V.B.2 (describing the reputation concerns of tax haven banking
industries).
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clients and the government-is public within relevant reputation markets.
Effective signaling requires the existence of a compliance norm of
some kind. Absent such a norm, a visible compliance choice cannot serve
as a good-reputation proxy. This Article assumes that the pre-existing
norm is a noncompliance norm. This means that some other mechanism,
such as enforcement-based penalties and detection, or an expressive norm-
building mechanism, must generate a compliance norm before signaling
can effectively incent tax compliance.
C. How Deterrence, Separation, and Signaling Interact
Deterrence, separation, and signaling mechanisms interact and can
reinforce each other. As described below, relationships exist between
deterrence and separation, deterrence and signaling, and separation and
signaling. In each case, causality runs in both directions.
1. Deterrence and Separation
Consider first the relationship between deterrence and separation. The
idea of deterrence, which proceeds from the premise that penalties incent
rational taxpayers to comply, is that it can transform noncompliant
taxpayers into compliant taxpayers. The dependent variable or goal of
deterrence is not an inherent or exogenous quality of a compliant nature or
personality, but rather an exhibited taxpayer behavior. Under a deterrence
theory, taxpayers' compliance behavior must be fluid, not exogenous. This
view of deterrence follows Leandra Lederman in contending that
sufficiently increased enforcement may produce a new and more compliant
norm.
28
If deterrence persuades some noncompliers to act as compliers,
deterrence should expand the group eligible to self-identify as compliant to
obtain the benefits of a compliance-appropriate government regime under
the separation mechanism. Separation can also reinforce deterrence
because it can produce the disclosure of information that makes it easier
for the government to carry out its enforcement program. For example,
separation can make it easier to audit taxpayers who have self-declared as
compliant to ensure that they are in fact complying.
2. Deterrence and Signaling
Deterrence can also strengthen reputation signaling. This is because
effective signaling requires the existence of a compliance norm.
Successful deterrence, by pushing taxpayers into the compliant group,
28 Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64
OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1508 (2003) ("It may, therefore, be possible to change normative commitments by
reducing the opportunity for noncompliance, such as through increased enforcement of the tax laws.").
2012]
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tends to make compliance a more dominant behavior, thus increasing the
chance that it will be understood to connote good reputation.29 In addition,
because of the behavioral tendency toward commitment consistency, self-
identifying as compliant for any reason-including a reason relating solely
to concerns about government enforcement-should make a taxpayer more
likely to in fact behave in a compliant way and associate compliance with
30good reputation.
In the other direction, signaling influences deterrence by changing the
individual utility curve referenced by a taxpayer when making a decision
as to whether to evade tax. If compliance brings reputational benefits, the
tax evasion calculus, which compares the amount of saved tax to the risk-
adjusted penalty for cheating, changes. In particular, the reputational
benefit of advertising compliance adds to the list of factors that incents tax
compliance. Good reputation-understood within the context of
appropriate norms-has positive utility.
31
3. Separation and Signaling
Separation, or compliant taxpayers' self-identification to the
government, supports signaling in two different ways. The key to the first
is commitment consistency. Taxpayers' self-identification in response to a
separation program is at least a quasi-public declaration about their
compliance values. After such a declaration, taxpayers will be more likely
to internalize such compliance as consistent with their view of themselves
and with their desire to demonstrate their good reputation. Separation also
may strengthen signaling because the act of self-identification to the
government as a compliant taxpayer can serve as a strong reputational
signal. The more effective self-identification is as a utility-enhancing
signaling mechanism, the more likely a taxpayer will be willing to self-
identify as compliant for purposes of the separation mechanism.
In the other direction, signaling can change the separation dynamic by
adding a reputation-market separation function. For example, reputation
market participants could apply categorically different and more
advantageous rules of interaction to a taxpayer who displays a positive
reputation signal. This is apart from any government promise to treat
compliers and noncompliers differently.32
29 Seeid. at 1509-10.30 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (discussing commitment consistency).
31 Since signaling is consistent with a rational actor model, it may seem redundant to say that it
also supports deterrence. This Article separates the two ideas to emphasize that even if a compliance
norm has moral origins, it can immediately serve a deterrence purpose as well.
32 This Article distinguishes the concepts of signaling and the concept of reputation-market
separation to emphasize that a reputation market may develop influential and separating rules of thumb
(consider the tendency to divide markets into "tiers") loosely based on, but existing separately from,
reputational signals delivered in individual interactions.
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D. Set Aside Crowding Out
High penalties may have the potential to crowd out compliant behavior
as well as to serve the compliance-enhancing functions of deterrence,
separation, and signaling.33  Some argue that high penalties can
commoditize, and thereby undermine, previous social norms of
compliance.34 Or high penalties may be interpreted by a compliant
taxpayer as a defecting move in the previously reciprocal tit-for-tat
compliance relationship the taxpayer had built with the government. 35
The penalties in the offshore account case, which are triggered by
narrowly defined failures to report, may successfully resolve the risk that
high penalties will crowd out compliant behavior, since they are arguably
"'appropriately tailored' penalties 'aimed specifically' at taxpayers who
ignore tax compliance. 36  Also, it is not clear just how strong a
phenomenon crowding out is." In any case, this Article will focus on
penalties only, not rewards, and it sets aside the possibility of crowding outin an effort to streamline the analysis.
III. THREE SUPPORTS OF HIGH-PENALTY REGIMES
A high-penalty regime can produce the mutually reinforcing
mechanisms of deterrence, separation, and signaling described in Part II.
But achieving these results requires the three supports of penalty
credibility, the perception that the noncompliers who masquerade as
33 See Doran, supra note 6, at 133 (describing the conundrum presented when crowding out
suggests that high penalties may reduce voluntary compliance, but deterrence theory suggests that high
penalties will increase compliance); Eric Fleisig-Greene, Law's War with Conscience: The
Psychological Limits of Enforcement, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1203, 1233-35 (arguing that law can have an
adverse impact on previously existing positive norms and citing one empirical study suggesting that
taxpayers who received letters notifying them of a likely audit reported less income than other
taxpayers).
34 See, e.g., Marjorie Kornhauser, Normative and Cognitive Aspects of Tax Compliance:
Literature Review and Recommendations for the IRS Regarding Individual Taxpayers, in 2 NAT'L
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 138, 151 (2007) (arguing that a
commodified exchange view of taxation can "crowd[] out positive normative influences on
[compliance] behavior" and prompt taxpayers to believe that the government is not fair); Komhauser,
supra note 16, at 739 & n.21 (noting the importance of procedural fairness and reciprocal trust for
compliant taxpayers).
35 See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 71, 83-84 (2003) (noting the inconsistency of audit threats with a reciprocal compliance
relationship).
36 Doran, supra note 6, at 133 (quoting Kahan, supra note 35, at 79); see also Morse, supra note
16, at 510-12 (arguing that publicizing penalties and rewards commensurate with taxpayer behavior
would minimize the crowding-out problem).
"7 Compare Lederman, supra note 28, at 1489-99 (arguing that available evidence supports the
view that taxpayers generally interpret sanctions and enforcement as measures that properly target
evading taxpayers, thus supporting a compliance norm), with Kahan, supra note 23, at 377 (citing
studies that support crowding out).
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compliers will be detected, and the absence of close substitutes. In the
cases of penalty credibility and masquerading noncomplier detection,
government enforcement and/or a robust reputation market can provide the
supports.
A. Penalty Credibility
Penalty credibility based on government enforcement depends on more
than the penalties as stated in the statute books. Various factors contribute
to gaps between an on-the-books penalty and its enforcement in practice.
These may include litigation risk management;38 internal agency politics,
such as a desire to stick to prior practice or avoid adversarial relationships
with regulatees; 39 national politics, including the goal of avoiding backlash
legislation that could curb the agency's power or resources in response to
an excessively tough public image;40 and international politics, including a
reluctance to upset foreign governments by pushing U.S. policies that
appear harsh and unilateral.4'
A conceptually distinct-and more important 4 -gap also often exists
between a de jure penalty and taxpayers' perception of a de facto penalty
policy. Taxpayers' internal perception of the likelihood of penalty
imposition drives their compliance decisions; hence, this perception is the
real key to this element of a successful high-penalty strategy.43 Elements
that influence this perception include how the agency actually imposes
penalties; whether it says it will impose penalties; and how information
38 See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 44-47 (1992) (arguing that an agency that threatens serious punishments may
be "vulnerable to a litigious firm determined to shatter its myth of invincibility").
39 For example, although the IRS has broad statutory powers to summon documents, see I.R.C. §
7602 (2006), and the Supreme Court has vindicated its authority to use these powers to summon tax
accrual workpapers prepared by accountants, United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 816
(1984), the IRS has historically followed a "policy of restraint" under which it will only seek
workpapers "to obtain collateral sources of data, not to fish for new issues," Thomas J. Monks, Your
Papers, Please: Requests for FIN 48 Workpapers, 125 TAx NOTES 901, at nn.72-75 (2009). This
restraint may stem from habit as well as from a desire to dodge litigation risks, limit exposure to
restrictive statutory changes, and/or avoid souring relationships with taxpayers. See generally Dennis
J. Ventry Jr., A Primer on Tax Work Product for Federal Courts, 123 TAX NOTES 875 (2009) (arguing
that tax accrual workpapers can never constitute protected work product).
4 See, e.g., Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial
Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 79-81 (2004)
(describing the public perception of an overzealous IRS that led to the passage of a statute curtailing the
agency's power).
41 Cf JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS 63-65
(2004) (connecting a "unilateral" approach to American foreign policy and the "decline of America's
attractiveness abroad").
42 See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 38, at 44-47 (identifying regulatees' perception
of an agency's "invincibility" as a key factor).
4 Cf Lawsky, supra note 6, at 1041-42 (making a parallel point about the importance of
taxpayers' beliefs about the law's certainty).
[Vol. 44:675
TAX COMPLIANCE UNDER HIGH-PENALTY REGIMES
about penalty imposition and rhetoric is made public and, separately,
publicized.
If affected taxpayers perceive that the reputation market is well-
supplied with information and able to impose reputational sanctions,
credible reputation penalties can also support compliance. One kind of
reputational penalty consists of the stigma that may attach if a taxpayer is
audited and charged with tax evasion.44  However, in many cases,
taxpayers' actual compliance behavior is confidential and not visible.45 In
these cases, the possibility of public litigation provides the main possible
reputational feedback loop. Its power is limited because audit, let alone
litigation, is unlikely.
But sometimes taxpayers' compliance behavior is visible. Tax
intermediaries with third-party withholding and/or reporting obligations
and pass-through entities, such as partnerships and S corporations, provide
two examples. If a robust reputation market can observe tax compliance
behavior, and if this market gives taxpayers reputation demerits for tax
noncompliance, the reputation market can provide credible penalties that
can support compliance for reputation-sensitive taxpayers.
B. Detection and Information Strategies
As Alex Raskolnikov has persuasively argued, a key task in tax
administration is to identify noncompliers who masquerade as compliers.46
This point is highly relevant to a high-penalty regime, whether the high
penalty is intended to serve only the separation purpose that Raskolnikov
identified in the context of menu-based regulatory penalty default
structures or whether the high penalty also functions as a deterrent and/or
signal. The deterrence function will also be frustrated if noncompliers can
hide behind a mask of compliance. Signaling will falter if "[con
artists... send false signals of being cooperative."' 4 Moreover, masked
noncompliance might become a known workaround that can serve as a
competing signal.
The focus on the identification of noncompliers masquerading as
compliers does not dismiss the more general goal of discovering and
penalizing noncompliers. But that goal belongs with the analysis in
Section III.A, above, which discusses whether taxpayers perceive penalties
as credible possibilities. Assuming that they do, and that they self-identify
as compliers, the necessity of detection and information strategies to
4 See Posner, supra note 14, at 1789 (describing the bad-type tax audit signal).
45 See supra note 26 and accompanying text (explaining the problem of communicating tax
compliance).
46 See Raskolnikov, supra note 13, at 724-28 (exploring several ways to increase the likelihood of
detection in the compliance group).
" Schaefer, supra note 25, at 446-47.
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determine whether they are telling the truth is a separate and important
component of an effective high-penalty strategy.
Either the government or a reputation market may detect masked
noncompliance. For the government, one way that information filing can
improve detection is through its interaction with audit policy. In simplest
form, regulatees who identify themselves as compliers may be subject to
more frequent or more thorough audit.4' Larger populations of regulatees
require an audit selection strategy that identifies compliant filers who are
more likely to be in fact noncompliant. Part of this can be based solely on
the compliance information provided by regulatees, as they can be sorted
based on statistical information about the likelihood of compliance by
regulatees who meet certain descriptive characteristics. This works only if
those characteristics are available in information provided to the regulating
agency and it works best if the data are provided in a form that allows
automatic information searching.
A different audit selection strategy may be available if there are
alternative sources of information about regulatees. Third party reporting
is most prevalent in tax administration, but "non-tax documentation"
sources, 49 such as book-tax balance sheet differences, might also be used.
Strategies here go beyond sorting based on a statistical model built from
taxpayer-provided data. Instead, the regulator may analyze different
sources of data to check whether they match and/or to feed a richer
statistical model of the likelihood of compliance. Because of the
importance of interactions between alternative sources of data and the
taxpayer-provided information that signals compliance, careful design of
the reporting required by compliant taxpayers will increase the chance of
success for a high-penalty regime.
A reputational market might also police the possibility of
masquerading noncompliers. For example, in the case of third-party
intermediaries, or partnerships and S corporations, the clients or equity
owners who receive reports have a non-tax financial interest in ensuring
that the reports comprehensively list all income items. The omission of
48 This may be a sufficient strategy for a small population of regulatees, if it is possible to craft
the audit approach in a way that does not interfere with the goal of rewarding compliant taxpayers with
better service. The IRS's Compliance Assurance Program, or CAP, for large corporate taxpayers is an
example of an attempt to craft this kind of service-oriented audit strategy. See I.R.S. Announcement
2005-87, 2005-50 I.R.B. (Dec. 12, 2005) (anticipating government-taxpayer cooperation in the CAP
early issue resolution program); CLIFF JERNIGAN, CORPORATE TAX AUDIT SURVIVAL: A VIEW OF THE
IRS THROUGH CORPORATE INSIDER EYES 76-77 (2005) (explaining that the IRS invited taxpayers with
a "history of honest dealings" to participate in CAP). But see Leigh Osofsky, Getting Realistic About
Responsive Tax Administration (Oct. 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing
that an absence of data on CAP makes it impossible to evaluate the success of the program and the
extent of problems of regulatory capture).
49 Joshua D. Blank, Overcoming Overdisclosure: Toward Tax Shelter Detection, 56 UCLA L.
REv. 1629, 1685-86 (2009).
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some items might suggest that the value of the account or equity interest is
not accurately stated in the records of the intermediary or entity. The
inaccuracy of tax reports might also flag a broader mismanagement or
agency cost problem.50
C. No Close Substitutes
Like any other kind of rule, the operation of a high-penalty regime will
also be affected by the ability of taxpayers to avoid the whole scheme by
making choices that are sufficiently close substitutes for the penalized
behavior. The success of a high penalty for a particular infraction requires
the absence of sufficiently close substitutes for the penalized action. The
penalty will be less effective if the taxpayer can make choices that achieve
the goal of tax evasion without incurring a penalty.
David Weisbach has conceptualized the idea of minimizing close
substitutes for a taxed activity as the goal of reducing the "marginal
efficiency cost of funds," which is lower if fewer behavioral distortions
result from the imposition of a tax.5 He identifies the problem of "close
substitutes" as a problem that can arise because of (1) legal line-drawing
exercises that categorize, for example, debt and equity differently, and (2)
the readiness to "shift[] to another transaction., 52
Similarly, David Schizer has categorized the factors that may
determine whether a particular "friction" prevents taxpayers from planning
around a particular rule." Schizer notes that strong and non-malleable
frictions, which may come in the form of business choice preferences,
technology limitations, and legal and accounting costs, can hinder or
prevent the development of close substitutes.54 The absence of close
substitutes or, similarly, the existence of strong and inflexible frictions, is
key to the success of a strategy that imposes high penalties on certain
s0 In the case of politicians who disclose their tax returns, adverse political interests and the media
may discover and publicize discrepancies between tax returns and underlying facts. See, e.g., Kristin
Jensen & Edwin Chen, Daschle Withdraws Nomination Following Tax Questions, BLOOMBERG (Feb.
3, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=akIcFNSWPWg (reporting
Tom Daschle's withdrawal from consideration for the position of Secretary of Health and Human
Services after tax return review revealed a failure to report income attributable to the use of a car and
driver).
5' David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L.
REV. 1627, 1665-68 (1999) (defining marginal efficiency cost of funds as the ratio between the
revenue from a tax change with no behavioral distortion and the actual-presumably lower but still
positive-revenue including the impact of behavioral effects).
121d. at 1661-62.
53 David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1312,
1323-25 (2001).54 Id. at 1323-34.
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behaviors."
D. All Three Supports Needed
All three of the supports-(i) taxpayer perception of penalties, (ii)
taxpayer perception of detection of masquerading noncompliers, and (iii)
an absence of close substitutes-are essential to the success of the
compliance mechanisms of deterrence, separation, and/or signaling under a
high-penalty regime. In the case of deterrence, the perceived (not actual)
likelihood of penalty and detection are the inputs into the calculus of the
expected benefits and burdens of tax evasion, and a close-substitute
activity will prompt a choice that avoids the calculus altogether. The
absence of any of the three provides a loophole that can ruin the whole
deterrence project. For example, a very high likelihood of penalty
imposition cannot effectively deter if there is a zero probability of
detection of noncompliers who falsely present themselves as compliers or
the presence of a costless close substitute.
Penalty credibility, detection, and close substitutes relate to separation
in a way similar to the way in which they relate to deterrence. A
taxpayer's decision as to whether to identify as a complier is shaped by the
perceived benefits and burdens of the compliance and noncompliance
regimes. First, taxpayers presumably require an incentive before they will
take the trouble to self-identify as compliant. Second, absent effective
detection, compliance regimes will be inappropriately extended to
masquerading noncompliers. Finally, a close substitute option eliminates
the necessity of choosing from the government's menu.
A robust reputation market, as well as government enforcement action,
can also provide the supports of penalty credibility and masquerading
noncomplier detection for the compliance mechanisms of deterrence and
separation. If a relevant reputation market assigns reputation demerits to
noncompliant taxpayers and can detect compliant and noncompliant
taxpayers, then the utility of noncompliance decreases and noncompliant
taxpayers will be deterred under the rational actor model. In addition, the
existence of a visible compliance signal such as a third-party reporting
requirement forces taxpayers to self-identify as compliant or noncompliant,
and the reputation market may then separate the two groups by applying
different sets of rules to each. If the reputation market values compliance,
it will assign a more attractive set of rules to the compliant category.
In the case of signaling, these reputation supports are central to the
compliance project. In order for a signaling compliance mechanism to
'5 See, e.g., Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 9, at 1740-41 (arguing that the
absence of "alternative arrangements" increases the likelihood of success of an information reporting
provision).
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succeed, taxpayers must perceive that the reputation market will impose
penalties for noncompliance, and that the market can detect masquerading
noncompliers. Taxpayers do not, however, necessarily need to believe that
the government will penalize them for noncompliance, or detect
noncompliers who pretend to masquerade as compliers, in order for the
signaling mechanism to work. The desired outcome under the signaling
goal is not mediated by the government, but rather by the reputational
market populated by, for example, the taxpayer's peers and/or clients.
A close substitute can singlehandedly derail a signaling goal even if
the reputational market is working well. The reason is that the close
substitute behavior may become the norm that everyone gathers around.
Regardless of the quality of enforcement of high penalties for prohibited
behavior, a close substitute can function as a competing signal that
undermines the signaling power of the enacted and enforced law, so long
as the close substitute is sufficiently well known. Regulatees may gather
around the workaround as an indicator of sufficiently compliant behavior,
rather than around the law as enacted, just as motorists may informally
agree that driving after two drinks is safe enough.
IV. EXPRESSIVE LAW, REPUTATION, AND TAX COMPLIANCE
A. Plan B: Expressive Law
Part III described how the three supports of credible penalties, credible
detection policy, and lack of close substitutes can bring about tax
compliance through the mechanisms of deterrence, separation, and/or
signaling under a high-penalty regime. Effective government enforcement
is one route to credible penalties and credible detection policy. But what if
effective government enforcement is not possible? In the starting-point
scenario that this Article considers-specifically, where there is no pre-
existing norm of tax compliance-advertising tax compliance carries few
initial reputational benefits and signaling has little force. In other words,
the reputation market cannot provide credible penalties and masquerading
noncomplier detection. At least it cannot do so until a norm of tax
compliance is created. Enter expressive law. 6
56 See Cooter, supra note 19, at 607 ("Law provides an instrument for changing social norms by
expressing commitments."); Posner, supra note 14, at 1798-99 (observing that the government is a
player in the norm creation game and can send signals that affect taxpayer behavior); Cass R. Sunstein,
Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1129, 1137-38 (1986) (explaining that
law helps to determine preferences and exploring related democratic theory problems). It is not
necessary here to argue that government expressions about the law must have moral content; it is
enough to conceive of expressive law as an instrumental tool that can alter social norms. See Matthew
D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1497 (2000)
(arguing that "the proper methodology for assessing governmental speech is scientific, not moral,"
although a "moral framework" is necessary in order to evaluate the results of government speech).
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There may be circumstances where a government must choose
between an enforced high-penalty strategy and an expressive law approach.
Resource constraints, or a situation where both strategies were available
but one is not compatible with the other, might force such a choice. But
this Article does not advance any criteria for such a choice. Rather, it
considers a simpler situation, where the government has already committed
resources to a high-penalty regime, and where it cannot construct the
penalty and detection supports with enforcement (for example, because of
a lack of jurisdiction). In this case, at least, it should consider the use of an
expressive law Plan B.
B. Reputation-Sensitive Tax Evaders
The idea of targeting an expressive law strategy at an apparently
determined noncomplier may seem silly. For example, the offshore
account holders or bank secrecy-focused non-U.S. banks discussed in Parts
V, VI, and VII have historically not complied with U.S. requirements to
disclose the existence of U.S.-held non-U.S. bank accounts. Existing
accounts of expressive law might categorize such taxpayers or
intermediaries as "dedicated cheaters. 57 Alex Raskolnikov calls this the
"gamer" category, and endeavors to find a way to ensure that a taxpayer's
true gamer nature is revealed by a separation mechanism to permit, among
other things, the application of more draconian penalties to this group.58
Eric Posner concludes that signaling strategies will not work as applied to
"people in deviant communities," either because tax compliance lacks
salience as a reputational strategy, or because "people already have a low
opinion about that person.5 9
These analyses suggest that expressive law strategies are futile as
applied to determined evaders. How could expressive law and norm
development affect a taxpayer who views tax law as a game and does not
care about his reputation? The answer lies in the fact that a key
assumption is incorrect. In particular, it is possible that a historically
committed tax evader cares quite a bit about reputation, and this possibility
opens the door for an expressive law strategy.
In a situation where there is a tax noncompliance norm, an evader who
cares about reputation may well suffer no reputational blow from failing to
comply with applicable tax requirements. The cash business situation
provides an example. If a store owner evades taxes, and all of his small-
business friends do likewise, the tax-evading store owner may experience
camaraderie or respect for a particularly clever evasion strategy, rather than
57 Kahan, supra note 35, at 84.
58 Raskolnikov, supra note 13, at 691.
59 Posner, supra note 14, at 1795.
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a blow to her reputation.60 The offshore account situation explored further
in Parts V, VI, and VII provides other examples. The U.S. individual with
a Swiss bank account might be seen by her peers as rich, clever, or
cosmopolitan; and the Swiss bank that found a dodgy way around a
requirement to disclose U.S. account holders might be seen as offering
excellent, personalized client service while respecting its longstanding
national bank secrecy tradition.
If a historically committed tax evader cares about reputation, and it is
possible to build a norm that casts tax compliance as the reputation-
enhancing behavior, then the reputation-sensitive historic tax evader might
start to experience reputation benefits from signaling consistency with the
new tax compliance norm. This appears to have happened recently in the
tax haven context, where efforts to brand tax havens as nefarious have
apparently produced countries' agreement to signal their compliance with a
new norm involving at least some commitment to information disclosure
and transparency. Section V.B discusses this story in more detail.
C. Norm Entrepreneurship and Tax Compliance
1. Norm Building in the Tax Context
Building a norm-by which I mean, following Robert Ellickson, a
"rule supported by a pattern of informal sanctions"61-requires some kind
of communication. Expressive law norm-building has been described as a
"[c]ommunication [that] establishes a public space of meanings and shared
understandings between the speaker and addressee. 62 Law can express
moral principles, such as race equality or animal rights.63 It can also
express a solution to a collective action problem,64 which has been called
the "least controversial case for the expressive function of law. 65 A law
might provide a focal point for cooperative decision-making, for example
60 See Morse, Karlinsky & Bankman, supra note 2, at 65-66 (describing tax noncompliance
behavior of small businesses as consistent with group norms).
61 Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537, 549
n.58 (1998).
62 Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503, 1574 (2000).
63 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2043-44
(1996) (discussing the connection between public norms and private norm entrepreneurs).
64 See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 19, at 607-08 (describing norm development as a way to
accomplish a Pareto self-improvement through cooperation); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point
Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REv. 1649, 1654-58 (2000) (describing expressive law as a way
to solve coordination games); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L.
REv. 1697, 1729-36 (1996) (considering ways in which the government could foster the replacement
of inefficient norms with efficient norms).
65 Sunstein, supra note 63, at 2033.
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by requiring cars to drive on one side of the road.66 Or a law might provide
an honorable excuse for individuals to avoid mutually destructive activity,
for example by prohibiting individuals convicted of dueling from holding
public office.67
Moral expressive law strategies do not have a large following when it
comes to the problem of tax compliance. Exhorting large groups of
individual taxpayers to pay their taxes because it is the right thing to do
may have met historical success in the extreme context of wartime crisis,
which provides an opportunity for messages with unparalleled salience as
well as consensus with respect to public goods6
8 and reciprocity.69
However, outside that context, few seem to consider a normative approach
to tax compliance a very promising strategy. Available empirical evidence
is sparse and mixed.7°
Tax compliance might seem to be a classic collective action problem.
Perhaps we should expect taxpayers to comply if they know that others
will also comply, so that the funding of public goods will be a successful
collective exercise. But in many cases of interest taxpayers do not
experience tax compliance as a collective action problem.
First, the collective action problem likely lacks salience for
stakeholders in the tax compliance case because the public benefit
produced by better tax compliance-a marginal improvement to the public
finance system--is confusing, remote, and somewhat boring. It is
cognitively difficult for taxpayers to appreciate this marginal public
benefit.7' Related research investigating the relationship between tax
compliance and perceived government legitimacy, or trust in government,
reaches inconsistent results regarding whether these factors are positively
correlated with tax compliance.72
66 See McAdams, supra note 64, at 1667 (illustrating a coordination problem in lawmaking using
a basic driving example).67 See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 968-72
(1995) (discussing dueling in the American South).
61 See Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion of the
Income Tax During World War II, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 685, 686-87 (1989) (discussing how tax
propagandists encouraged tax compliance during World War II).
69 See STEVEN A. BANK ET AL., WAR AND TAXES 172-74 (2008) (describing "shared sacrifice"
rhetoric and its use in wartime tax policy).70 See, e.g., Marsha Blumenthal et al., Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax Compliance? Evidence
from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 125, 130-32 (2001) (reporting positive,
but statistically insignificant, improvements in tax compliance for taxpayers who received letters either
stating that nearly all Minnesota taxpayers were compliant or listing certain public benefits paid for by
tax revenues).
71 See Schenk, supra note 7, at 270-72 (exploring reasons for taxpayers' ignorance of taxes).
72 Compare I TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH 129 (Jeffrey A. Roth et al.
eds., 1989) (reporting little correlation between perceived government legitimacy and tax compliance),
and Komhauser, supra note 16, at 738 (noting pervasive and historic "antitax schemas" in American
culture), with James Alm et al., Fiscal Exchange, Collective Decision Institutions and Tax Compliance,
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Second, even a decision of all noncompliant taxpayers to shift their
compliance behavior and start to comply may not result in a net benefit to
the taxpayers who change their behavior. Most U.S. taxpayers have no
choice about their compliance: their taxable income is automatically
withheld upon or at least automatically reported to the government. The
difficult compliance questions relate to taxpayers who have the opportunity
to evade tax and have historically done so. But the public benefits of
increased compliance (e.g., lower overall tax rates)73 would be spread over
all taxpayers, not just those whose compliance increases-and the vast
majority of U.S. taxpayers have no choice but to comply.
Moral appeals and collective action solutions targeted at the taxpayer
population in general may lack promise in the tax compliance context. But
the connection between expressive law and potential reputation benefits
may nevertheless be exploited. It is important to distinguish here between
normative rhetoric aimed at large groups of individual taxpayers and
normative messaging that engages smaller groups of larger taxpayers,
including tax intermediaries. In the individual taxpayer
situation--although the experiment has not been run with enough energy
and creativity to reject it out of hand-normative rhetoric is less promising
because it lacks the support of a strong reputation signaling mechanism.
This is because individual reputation is mediated by small-group norms
that can be difficult for the government to penetrate,74 and because usually
no one observes individuals' tax compliance behavior.75 Large tax
intermediaries, however, typically must defend their reputation in a larger
22 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 285, 288 (1993) (reporting experimental results showing a correlation
between tax compliance and support for public goods), and Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The
Economics of Tax Evasion, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 40 (2007) (citing survey evidence of a correlation
between disapproval of tax evasion and declared trust in government, but noting that such survey
results could reflect rationalizations of pre-existing compliance decisions).
7" Various kinds of public benefits are possible, including lower enforcement expenditures; less
tax planning deadweight loss; and greater economic productivity due to better allocation of resources.
See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CrIzEN's GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER
TAXES 177-80 (4th ed. 2008) (citing problems of tax evasion, including inequitable sharing of tax
burdens and economic costs).
74 See Morse, supra note 16, at 505-06 (arguing that small-group norms among similar taxpayers
have a clearer link to tax compliance than large-group or national norms); Susan Morse, Tax
Compliance and the Love Molecule, ARiZ. ST. L.J. BLOG (Sept. 26, 2011),
http://asulawjournal.lawnews-asu.org/?p=356 (arguing that narrative communications that engage
small-group reciprocity have promise as a tax compliance strategy). As Lynn Stout has explained in
the course of exploring the relationship between law and conscience, the several evolutionary biology
explanations for "prosocial" behavior support the conclusion that "altruistic cooperation tends to occur
only with other members of one's in-group." LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD
LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE 144-45 (2011). The in-group concept, although "plastic," might not easily
encompass the whole citizenry absent a moment of national war or other crisis. Id. at 146-47.
75 See, e.g., Doran, supra note 6, at 135-38 (arguing that tax compliance and noncompliance are
private behaviors); Posner, supra note 26, at 468 (outlining the problem of communicating tax
compliance as a signal).
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national or global market, and their compliance behavior is often visible.
Such intermediaries are thus good candidates for reputation signaling.
The government's expressive law task is to persuade some taxpayers to
internalize a new tax compliance norm and act as private norm
entrepreneurs within the context of a reputation market. The informal
sanctions of such a market can then provide the credible penalty and
credible detection supports needed for successful deterrence, separation,
and signaling strategies. Moreover, signaling has a virtuous-circle capacity
to self-reinforce. First, the more taxpayers comply, the stronger the
positive reputation signal, the stronger the incentive for other taxpayers to
comply as well, and the higher the likelihood that a reputation market will
recognize compliance as an important input into heuristics like the
categorization of firms into different "tiers." Second, taxpayers who
comply, for whatever reason, should experience a commitment consistency
attachment to compliant behavior.76
The question of how a norm is internalized is thorny and interesting,
but not crucial to the analysis here. It is possible that a private norm
entrepreneur could support a government expressive law strategy for cold
rational reasons, for example because the actor recognizes a promising
branding opportunity offered by developing the norm as a positive
reputational signal." A rational path could also feature collective action
among a subset of previously noncompliant taxpayers who find that all of
them will gain from cooperation, even though the complete group of
noncompliant taxpayers might not experience a net gain from
compliance.7
It is also possible for a private norm entrepreneur to be motivated by
some higher ideal, such as the morality of paying taxes, or the idea of
honesty, even though inconsistent with its own self-interest, so that the
norm is born outside the bounds of the rational actor model.79  But
immediately the norm can be understood as a preference for tax
compliance that can be understood to fall within the bounds of the rational
actor model.80  The norm could also quickly support positive reputation
signaling, also conceptualized within the bounds of a rational actor
76 See supra Section H.B.
77 See Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35, 42-43
(2002) (noting the debate over whether norms are internalized in the course of individuals' pursuit of
rational interests).
78 Cf infra note 109 and accompanying text (describing the OECD's harmful tax practice project
as a cooperative project among a subset of nations).79 See Geisinger, supra note 77, at 49-52 (analyzing theories of expressive law and
internalization).80 Cf LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC EcoNoMIcs 45 (2008)
(comparing different social welfare functions derived from different philosophical outlooks).
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2. Norm-Building Tactics: Reputation Referencing, Salience,
Management Targeting, and Incrementalism
The goal of an expressive law strategy is to stimulate signaling and
encourage reputational sanctions for a failure to signal. Whatever message
the government uses should reference reputation, demonstrate high
salience, and provide opportunities for taxpayers to show their
commitment to the norm. The fact that the articulation of the norm needs
to reference reputation likely means that the language will have a moral
tone. But that does not mean that the internalization mechanism is moral
rather than rationally self-interested.
In addition, if directed at organizations, such as large tax
intermediaries, an expressive law strategy should target the people at the
top. This is because group norms within a business organization are
82heavily influenced by the views of the leaders of the organization. Group
members tend to defer to information offered by others instead of forming
their own opinions, especially when the person who offers the information
is a peer or supervisor.83 Donald Langevoort gives the example of large
corporations' hierarchy-led tendency to develop optimism biases that lead
to overcommitment and overbidding for assets,84 but nothing prevents this
organizational behavior tendency from reinforcing compliance norms.
Tax compliance measures aimed at large enterprises present some of
the same problems as the regulation of large enterprises in general.
Corporations, for example, may act only through the individuals that
comprise them, but these individuals are strongly incentivized to conform
to the corporate hierarchical example, which is typically formed at least in
part by the corporation's profit motive. Corporate employees may "not
become as purely self-interested as Economic Man, [but] may at least
behave like his second cousin, Corporation Man";85 for example, they may
be less swayed by independent moral norms in their corporate lives
compared to their individual lives.
But the strength of the corporate hierarchy can be used to engage
81 See supra note 15 and accompanying text (citing work relating to norms within an economic
framework).
82 See, e.g., JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 99-100 (2d ed. 1993)
(noting that disproportionate weight may be accorded to norms held by senior group members).
83 See Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information
Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 1012-13 (2005) (discussing possible benefits and detriments of group
decision-making).
84 See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 131, 139-40
(1997) (noting that corporations themselves "develop belief systems" and can amplify "optimistic
biases").
85 STOUT, supra note 74, at 169.
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virtuous as well as vicious cycles, for example by government moves that
incent compliant behavior at the top of the corporate hierarchy. Elsewhere,
I have argued that Sarbanes-Oxley managed to perform this task in a way
that contributed significantly to the general demise of the public
corporation tax shelter business that had flourished in the 1990s.
86
Sarbanes-Oxley and other regulatory movements have in the last decade or
so produced the proliferation of Chief Compliance Officers at large firms.
87
It is these individuals, among others, who should be targeted by an
expressive law strategy.
Finally, an expressive law strategy may lend itself to incrementalism.
88
The idea is that once a norm gains a toehold, reputational signaling may
strengthen it through the virtuous circles described above. A norm that
begins on a small scale may be capable of expansion over time as more and
more firms adopt it.
V. AN EXAMPLE: OFFSHORE ACCOUNT INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
A. The Problem
The remainder of this Article uses the example of offshore accounts to
illustrate both the compliance support factors outlined in Part III and the
expressive law theory described in Part IV. This Part introduces the
problem of offshore accounts and describes the OECD's successful
expressive law effort to weaken bank secrecy laws that enable the evasion
of income related to these accounts. Part VI contends that the Report of
Foreign Bank and Financial Reports, or FBAR, reporting requirements
applicable to U.S. taxpayers who hold offshore accounts can be successful
based in large part on supports of perceived credible penalties and
masquerading noncomplier detection provided by government
enforcement. Part VII argues that U.S. government enforcement cannot
provide the supports of credible penalties and detection necessary to make
a success out of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act ("FATCA"),
86 See Susan Cleary Morse, The How and Why of the New Public Corporation Tax Shelter
Compliance Norm, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 961, 984 (2006) (arguing that concerns among top executives
about liability and adverse publicity under Sarbanes-Oxley, as well as tax shelter-related litigation,
increased the tax compliance of corporations).
8" See Harry Hurt I1, Drop that Ledger! This is the Compliance Officer, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,
2005, Section 3 (Sunday Business), at 5 (quoting Scott Cohen, editor and publisher of the trade journal
Compliance Week: "The big story is that Sarbanes-Oxley has shifted the power center at public
companies by homogenizing the roles of the general counsel and the compliance officer").
8 The idea of incrementalism comports with Robert Cooter's argument that different compliance
equilibria exist and that the changing prevalence of a compliance norm can produce a "tipping point"
that motivates a shift between equilibria. See Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An
Economic Analysis ofInternalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1577, 1587 (2000) (theorizing that peer-to-
peer influences induce shifts between compliance equilibria).
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which imposes information disclosure rules on non-U.S. financial
institutions for accounts owned by U.S. holders. Instead, FATCA invites
the application of the expressive law theory described in Part IV.
A 2002 Treasury report estimated that there were about one million
offshore accounts held by U.S. taxpayers and that less than twenty percent
of foreign bank account reports, or FBARs,89 were duly filed as required
annually.90 Estimates of the value of offshore accounts range from $1.5
trillion to about $10 billion.9t Low-end estimates of the U.S. tax collection
shortfall resulting from the failure to pay tax on offshore accounts come in
at about $50 billion annually.92 However, the number of FBAR filings has
increased. In 2004, taxpayers filed 217,699 FBARs and in 2009 534,043. 9'
The IRS has said that account holders come from "all walks" of
(relatively wealthy) life.94 One official has been reported as saying that of
50,000 accounts targeted by the UBS subpoena discussed below9 5-which
requested all accounts with U.S. connections at a certain bank, without any
filtering mechanism as to size or otherwise-a few thousand were
enormous accounts of tens or hundreds of millions of dollars, and the vast
majority smaller accounts of less than ten million dollars.96
Offshore account holders include heirs, immigrants, and expatriates
89 See infra Part VI for a more detailed discussion of FBARs.
9°See SEC'Y OF TREAS., A REPORT TO CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH § 361(b) OF THE
UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS REQUIRED TO
INTERCEPT AND OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT OF 2001 (USA PATRIOT ACT) 6 (Apr. 26, 2002) (noting
that the IRS estimated the number of foreign bank accounts at one million and the number of annual
FBAR filings at about 180,000).
91 See Banking Secrecy Practices and Wealthy American Taxpayers: Hearing of the Select
Revenue Measures Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee, 11 th Cong., 1st Sess.
(Mar. 31, 2009) (statement of Reuven S. Avi-Yonah) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah Statement] (deducing
U.S. residents' holdings from broader Boston Consulting Group estimate); see also RONEN PALAN ET
AL., TAX HAVENS: How GLOBALIZATION REALLY WORKS 62-63 (2010) (citing estimates of about $10
billion in financial assets held offshore by U.S. and non-U.S. taxpayers).
92 See Avi-Yonah Statement, supra note 91 (assembling various estimates of cash and securities
deposits offshore and translating those figures into an estimate of approximately $50 billion in unpaid
U.S. federal income tax annually); Martin A. Sullivan, US. Citizens Hide Hundreds of Billions in
Cayman Accounts, 103 TAX NOTES 956, 958 (May 24, 2004) (citing $70 billion estimate). A widely
cited $100 billion Senate Finance subcommittee report encompasses both corporate "abuses" and
individual "evasion." See U.S. SENATE, PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, TAX
HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE I & n.1 (2008). See also PALAN ET AL., supra note 91, at
63 (reaching a revenue loss estimate of $255 billion annually worldwide).93 See TREAS. INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., NEW LEGISLATION COULD AFFECT FILERS OF
THE REPORT OF FOREIGN BANK AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS, BUT POTENTIAL ISSUES ARE BEING
ADDRESSED 7 (Sept. 29, 2010) [hereinafter TIGTA Report].
94 See I.R.S. Information Release IR 2003-95 (July 30, 2003) ("People from all walks of life
applied for the [2003 voluntary disclosure] program, including lawyers, dentists, business executives,
estate heirs and numerous other occupations.").
95 See infra Section VI.B. 1.
96 Laura Saunders, IRS Extends Deadline to Declare Foreign Accounts, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21,
2009, at C 1.
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with some personal connection to the location of their offshore account.9 7
Account holders who lack any non-U.S. connection may have various
reasons for opening the account, including misguided acceptance of an
unscrupulous planner's advice, 98 or nontax asset protection, as well as
determined and conscious tax evasion. Moreover, determined tax evaders
may have legal or illegal sources for their deposited funds, tax-paid or not.
Offshore account noncompliance presents a problem of information
asymmetry, rather than an issue of legal uncertainty. It is perfectly clear
that U.S. citizens and residents must pay U.S. taxes on their worldwide
income, including income that accrues to an offshore account.99 The
challenge is to make or persuade offshore account holders-and/or the
foreign banks where they do business-to disclose the relevant
information.
B. The OECD's Expressive Law Harmful Tax Project
1. The OECD's Project
In the 1990s, the OECD began to study the problem of "harmful tax
competition." The developed nations who make up the OECD's
membership generally have an interest in more robust residence-based
taxation, 100 and the harmful tax competition project (later renamed
97 See Jeremiah Coder, IRS Extends Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Deadline, 124 TAx NOTES
1297 (2009) (reporting practitioner report of inquiries from "immigrants or their children who created
accounts before coming to the United States"); cf Fred Feingold, Further Guidance Needed for the
Required Reporting of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts, 54 TAx NOTES INT'L 605 (2009)
(arguing that many FBAR nonfilers failed to file due to ignorance of the requirement).
98 At a Senate committee hearing in 2002, for example, lawmakers heard testimony from an
orthopedic surgeon and federal inmate. He had gotten into financial trouble, refused the offers of
several tax protestor promoters, and then entered into an offshore "business trust" arrangement
supported by "legal opinions and letters from several attorneys." He thought things were legal, he
claimed, until he discovered that the trust routed funds from Utah to the Isle of Man and then to Austria
and provided false receipts for the funds. He stated that he was attempting to extricate himself from the
situation when he was found out. Schemes, Scams and Cons: The IRS Strikes Back: Hearing Before the
S. Committee on Finance, 107th Cong. 6-8 (2002) (statement of Dr. Daniel Bullock).
99A U.S. citizen or resident alien may exclude certain income earned abroad from the
performance of services, but this foreign earned income exclusion does not exempt investment income
from U.S. tax. I.R.C. § 911 (2006).
100 Diane Ring, Who is Making International Tax Policy?: International Organizations as Power
Players in a High Stakes World, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 649, 710-11, 716 (2010) (explaining the role
of the OECD in this project and noting OECD "revenue-protecting countries" and the "vocal backlash"
from the "business community" and "tax haven jurisdictions"). Thirty-four developed countries make
up the membership of the OECD. These nations are concentrated in Europe but also include Australia,
Canada, Japan, and the United States. Members and Partners, OECD, http://www.oecd.org (last
visited Dec. 16, 2011). Some criticize what they describe as the inappropriate meddling of the OECD
in the affairs of tax haven countries, which are often less developed than the members of the OECD.
See, e.g., Vaughn E. James, Twenty-First Century Pirates of the Caribbean: How the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development Robbed Fourteen CARICOM Countries of Their Tax and
Economic Policy Sovereignty, 34 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 1, 50 (2002) ("[T]he OECD
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"harmful tax practices" project)'' initially aimed at both low-tax regimes
that might attract business activity and secrecy regimes that permitted the
hiding of passive investment income.102  But the first goal of "stopping tax
havens from 'poaching' mobile capital" fell out, reportedly as a result of
the objections of tax havens and others, including the United States and
some Commonwealth nations. 10 3  The most prominent feature of the
remaining passive investment income portion of the project was the use of
a tax haven blacklist, first published in draft form in 2000.'04 The OECD
used the blacklist to press tax havens to move towards more information
reporting, and less bank secrecy.
The OECD and its member states were not about to use force to reduce
bank secrecy. Even if the days of gunboat diplomacy are not over, this
project, headed by the technocratic and consensus-building OECD, would
not have provoked its use.'0 5 Nor did the OECD offer tax havens a
monetary side payment in exchange for compliance. 10 6  Moreover, the
"defensive measures" promised by the OECD for countries on the list were
not particularly threatening for those havens singled out for helping
residents of high-tax OECD countries hide passive investment income.
Reduced foreign tax credits, for example, would not affect such tax
benefits. Some other provisions, such as requiring information reporting,
imposing withholding taxes, or enhancing audit activity or applicable
penalties for investments in tax havens, had more relevance. 10 7 But all of
these ideas faced very significant implementation obstacles, including the
necessity of coordinating national tax legislation among OECD members,
addressing jurisdictional limitations to enforce any requirements placed on
countries... can smile at their success in once again robbing the Caribbean of its gold-its sovereign
right to determine its tax and economic policies, and the rights of its people to shape their destiny.").
Others contend that tax haven activity violates distributive justice principles. See, e.g., NICHOLAS
SHAXSON, TREASURE ISLANDS: UNCOVERING THE DAMAGE OF OFFSHORE BANKING AND TAX HAVENS
7 (2011) (calling tax havens "a project of elites" and the "fortified refuge of Big Finance").
1 See J.C. SHARMAN, HAVENS IN A STORM: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL TAX REGULATION 88-
89 (2006) (describing the OECD's retreat from the controversial implication that "competition" could
be harmful).
102 See Alex Easson, Harmful Tax Competition: An Evaluation of the OECD Initiative, 34 TAX
NOTES INT'L 1037, 1038 (2004) (describing 1998 report). Secrecy, as along with low taxes, is widely
recognized as a tax haven badge. See PALAN ET AL., supra note 91, at 33-35.
103 SHARMAN, supra note 101, at 74.
'04 See OECD, 2000 PROGRESS REPORT: TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION: PROGRESS IN
IDENTIFYING AND ELIMINATING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES 17 (2000).
1o5 See SHARMAN, supra note 101, at 53-55 (describing the "military non-option" for settling
disputes over tax competition).
106 Compare OECD, supra note 104, at 25 (outlining only defensive measures for dealing with tax
havens), with Steven Dean, Philosopher Kings and International Tax: A New Approach to Tax Havens,
Tax Flight, and International Tax Cooperation, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 911, 954-56 (2007) (recommending
a side payment to banking jurisdictions to align tax compliance incentives).
107 See OECD, supra note 104, at 25 (listing the range of possible defensive measures used as
common approaches to uncooperative tax havens).
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offshore banks, and gathering the offshore information necessary to
support an audit and enforcement strategy. 108
This was not a situation where government-enforced penalties and
detection would likely produce successful deterrence, separation, or
signaling compliance mechanisms. Instead, the endeavor evolved into an
expressive law project, undertaken by a small group of countries,'0 9 to
persuade governments to signal their opposition to tax evasion. The
result-tax havens' agreement to enter into lukewarm tax information
exchange agreements-may appear to represent defeat for the OECD when
measured against the initial ambitious goals of stopping tax competition for
mobile active investment capital and achieving automatic information
exchange for passive investments. 0  But when viewed as a piece of an
incremental global information reporting project, the fact that the OECD
persuaded previously secretive jurisdictions to acknowledge that other
nations' tax evasion concerns could trump client confidentiality counts as a
battle triumph."t'
108 Cf SHARMAN, supra note 101, at 59-61 (describing tax havens' successful attempts to
convince some OECD members that sanctions would violate sovereignty). The situation resembles
Anne-Marie Slaughter's understanding of horizontal and vertical international networks of regulators.
Although the individual nations that are OECD members possess "hard power" to enforce, fine,
imprison, and so forth, there is no mechanism available for the OECD to force the member nations to
take such action. Indeed, there would not necessarily be any such mechanism even if the OECD had
"formal legal authority" over the member states. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER
168 (2004). Instead, as she suggests, the OECD must rely on soft power such as "information,
persuasion, [and] socialization." Id.
109 The harmful tax competition project is thus consistent with Robert Keohane's observation that
small groups may form international regimes (defined broadly and including "principles, norms, rules
and procedures") to further their shared interests but perhaps at the expense of other international
actors, including other nations. ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD
IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 59, 79 (1984).
Tl0he model OECD tax information exchange agreement requires governments to disclose
information only upon request-not automatically-and requires the requesting government to provide
considerable information about the targeted taxpayer. OECD, AGREEMENT ON EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION ON TAX MATTERS, art. 5, § 4 (2002). It is not yet clear how the provisions will work in
practice. See, e.g., Maria Flavia Ambrosanio & Maria Serena Caroppo, Eliminating Harmful Tax
Practices in Tax Havens: Defensive Measures by Major EU Countries and Tax Haven Reforms, 53
CAN. TAX J. 685, 717 (2005) (noting that very few tax haven jurisdictions had implemented national
legislation to accord with new information exchange requirements).
1 See SHARMAN, supra note 101, at 152-53 (noting the failure of the initiative's original broad
goals, but the possible success of the "scaled back project"). The modest success was also remarkable
because of the backdrop of a historic reluctance to enforce other countries' tax laws. See William S.
Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 161, 170-77, 202-06 (2002) (giving
history of "revenue rule" refusal to enforce other countries' tax laws and absence of mutual collection
assistance provisions from tax treaties). In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court restricted the application of
the revenue rule when it held, in a five to four decision, that a scheme to evade Canadian excise taxes
qualified as fraud under U.S. law and hence could support a wire fraud conviction. Pasquantino v.
United States, 544 U.S. 349, 356, 364 (2005).
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2. Norm Building Tactics: Reputation Referencing, Salience,
Management Targeting, and Incrementalism
The OECD's harmful tax practices project thus stands as an example
of a successful expressive law strategy that worked by triggering reputation
signaling. The endeavor worked partly because its targets-tax haven
governments-are and were extremely reputation-sensitive. l2  It also
worked because, despite various missteps and course changes, it was
effectively implemented. The project referenced reputation; used high-
salience communication techniques that gave targeted governments clear
opportunities to show their commitment to the norm; targeted people at the
top of governments; and modified its initial, overly-broad approach to a
winnable incremental strategy.
The OECD led the harmful tax practice project with normatively
loaded language by targeting "harmful tax competition."' 1 3 At first, the
OECD's target encompassed tax regimes applicable to active business
income.' 1 4  But later, the tax haven blacklist changed and simplified the
message. The countries proposed for the list were a who's who of small
passive income havens with robust bank secrecy laws, 1 5 rather than
developing countries seeking to attract foreign direct investment with tax
holidays and other incentives. Restricting the project scope to passive
income tax evasion clarified the message as, "good banks don't lie." It
plainly targeted bank secrecy in the absence of significant business
activity.
The list device gave the targeted countries an opportunity to provide a
clear, positive reputation signal by removing themselves from the blacklist.
To avoid being listed, a country had to (1) evidence a willingness to
exchange information (on request, not automatically) with OECD countries
112 See SHARMAN, supra note 101, at 107-14 (explaining the importance of reputation to tax
haven countries based on an extensive series of interviews and other corroborating research).
"3 See Arthur J. Cockfield, Protecting Taxpayer Privacy Rights Under Enhanced Cross-Border
Tax Information Exchange: Toward a Multilateral Tax-Payer Bill of Rights, 42 UNIV. OF BRIT.
COLUM. L. REV. 419, 428-29 (summarizing OECD's harmful tax competition project); Adam H.
Rosenzweig, Why Are There Tax Havens?, 52 WM. & MARY L. REv. 923, 928 (2010) (suggesting that
tax havens have been "singled out by institutions such as the OECD and G20 as the root cause of many
of the fiscal shortfalls plaguing the governments of the world").
"4 For example, one red flag listed in the OECD's 1998 report was "ring fencing," or offering tax
preferences to nonresidents only, a not-uncommon approach to attracting foreign direct investment.
OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 27 (1998).
"5 The 2000 report listed 35 havens: Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, the
Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, the British Virgin Islands, the Cook Islands, Dominica, Gibraltar,
Grenada, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Jersey, Liberia, Liechtenstein, the Maldives, the Marshall Islands,
Monaco, Montserrat, Nauru, the Netherlands Antilles, Niue, Panama, Samoa, the Seychelles, St. Lucia,
St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Tonga, Turks and Caicos, the U.S. Virgin
Islands, and Vanuatu. OECD, supra note 104, at 17. Several others, including Bermuda and the
Cayman Islands, avoided being placed on the list through pre-commitments to the OECD's requests.
See Easson, supra note 102, at 1042.
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who wished to do so and (2) ensure that its account holdings were
sufficiently transparent so that its supervising government had access to
beneficial owner information. 116 The information exchange portion of this
commitment had a further level of salience, as it generally involved signing
tax information exchange agreements ("TIEAs") for which the OECD
provided a model.1 17 And OECD meetings provided opportunities to put
pressure on senior decisionmakers in each country.'
1 18
Finally, the OECD's process was incremental. It began in the 1990s
with the articulation of harmful tax competition as a problem in a vague
formulation that was difficult to disagree with. It moved in 2000 to the
publication of a draft tax haven listing of thirty-five countries, which could
remove themselves from the list by promising to eliminate their harmful
tax practices before a deadline that was later extended three times. In April
2002, there were only seven countries left and in 2004 only five. 119
Subsequently, under the auspices of the OECD's follow-up project of
encouraging information exchange (though only on receipt of a fairly
detailed request), dozens of bilateral TIEAs have been entered into by
countries historically known as tax havens.
120
Reputation signaling explains why low-tax countries took pains to
avoid the OECD blacklist.l2 There is also evidence that the reputation
signaling foothold gained by the tax competition project had self-
reinforcing qualities that prompted countries that had supported the OECD
project to favor disclosure over bank secrecy more generally. Arguably the
project has caused a "good banks don't lie" norm to acquire some power as
a signaling touchstone. One indication of this virtuous circle effect is the
Swiss government's eventual decision to stretch the Swiss bank secrecy
laws almost to their breaking point.22 in order to permit the disclosure of
11
6 See Easson, supra note 102, at 1045-46.
117 See Geisinger & Stein, supra note 19, at 119 (discussing treaty ratification and treaty
compliance as signals of conformity to a prevailing international norm).
118 Cf SHARMAN, supra note 101, at 99-100 (explaining that tax haven states were brought into
the OECD consensus-building process as "participating partners").
119 Easson, supra note 102, at 1039.
120 See Charles Gnaedinger, OECD Tax Official Calls G-20 Summit an "Outstanding Success,"
TAX NOTES (2009), available at LEXIS, Tax Notes library, 2009 TNT 186-5 (reporting the execution
of ninety tax information exchange agreements and the amendment of sixty tax treaties and the launch
of the OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information, formed to conduct peer
reviews of the implementation of the agreements).
121 See SHARMAN, supra note 101, at 101 (arguing that reputation was the only issue for tax
havens); cf KEOHANE, supra note 109, at 105 (noting that "under conditions of uncertainty and
decentralization... [a] good reputation makes it easier for a government to enter into advantageous
international agreements").
122 See Bradley J. Bondi, Don't Tread On Me: Has the United States Government's Quest for
Customer Records from UBS Sounded the Death Knell for Swiss Bank Secrecy Laws?, 30 N.W. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 1, 3-6, 18-19 (2010) (describing historic Swiss commitment to bank secrecy and connection
to Swiss legal rule that tax evasion is a civil, not criminal, offense).
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U.S. account holder names in the UBS case, as discussed below,' 23 and to
enter into a TEA-based information exchange treaty protocol with the
United States.
124
This evidence does not mean that the countries that repealed bank
secrecy laws will definitely renounce their bank secrecy practices. Some
commentators have labeled putative tax haven countries' responses to the
OECD project "ritualistic" and "superficial," for example, and noted that
more "savvy" countries capitulated more rapidly to OECD demands,
perhaps because they more quickly came to the conclusion that there was
not much substance in them.125  The OECD's TIEA model, for example,
only removes the shield of bank secrecy to require the disclosure of
taxpayer information when the requesting country has provided a detailed
request naming the taxpayer. As a result, TIEAs might not actually
increase information flow in any material way. Moreover, the OECD
initially considered a country to have made sufficient progress to stay off
the blacklist if it had signed twelve TIEA agreements, regardless of the
size or trading importance of the counterparty countries.126 Some countries
entered into agreements with only a minimum number of small countries to
comply with the letter of the law.
27
Even so, the fact that countries took steps to avoid the blacklist
provides an excellent example of stakeholders taking actions for clearly
reputational reasons. Once they have done so, the groundwork is laid for a
successful high-penalty regime, kicked off by signaling but also perhaps
involving deterrence and separation. The harmful tax competition project
represents an incremental victory for the OECD.
123 See infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text (describing the UBS account holder disclosure
saga).
124 See Michael McIntyre, How to End the Charade of Information Exchange, 125 TAx NOTES
615 (2009) (calling the protocol "painful" for Switzerland, despite low expectations for significant
resulting information exchange).
125 See PALAN ET AL., supra note 91, at 205-07, 215.
1
26 See OECD, GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TAX
PURPOSES, TERMS OF REFERENCE TO MONITOR AND REVIEW PROGRESS TOWARDS TRANSPARENCY
AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TA PURPOSES 8 n.26 (2010) ("As agreed by the Global
Forum's Sub-group on Level Playing Field . .. a country is considered to have substantially
implemented the standard of exchange of information for the purposes of this Global Forum assessment
if it has in place signed agreements or unilateral mechanisms that provide for exchange of information
to standard with at least 12 OECD countries. This benchmark was considered to be an appropriate
dividing line at that point in time, between those countries that are implementing the standards and
those that are not. However, this benchmark was recognised as part of a staged process and would
have to be re-evaluated as circumstances evolved.").
127 See Nicholas Shaxson & John Christensen, Time to Black-List the Tax Haven Whitewash, FIN.
TIMES, Apr. 4, 2011 (reporting the practice of signing TIEAs with small countries such as "Greenland,
Iceland and the Faroes" and "between tax havens themselves" to comply with OECD requirements).
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VI. THE FBAR AS AN ENFORCED HIGH-PENALTY REGIME
A. The FBAR
National efforts also currently attempt to address the problem of
offshore accounts, including the U.S. foreign bank account reporting, or
FBAR, rules. Under a regulation promulgated under the Bank Secrecy
Act, 28 U.S. owners of offshore accounts must annually file Reports of
Foreign Banks and Financial Accounts, or FBARs, with respect to their
non-U.S. holdings. This requirement links to the individual income tax
return through Line 7a of Form 1040, Schedule B, which requires a
taxpayer to specify whether he or she has "an interest in or a signature or
other authority over a financial account in a foreign country.' ' 129  In
addition, recently enacted I.R.C. § 6038D-a "shadow FBAR" provision-
imposes similar self-reporting requirements.130 Section 6038D is important
to the government's offshore account audit strategy, as discussed below.
The Bank Secrecy Act originated as an anti-money-laundering
statute, 3 1 but there are at least three partially overlapping reasons for its
provisions, including the FBAR requirements. First, the depositor may
have illegally obtained the funds that go into an offshore account. Second,
the depositor, whether or not he or she has obtained the funds illegally,
may not have properly paid taxes with respect to them. Third, the
2
'See 31 U.S.C. § 5314 (2006); 31 C.F.R. § 103.24 (2010) ("Each person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States... having a financial interest in, or signature or other authority over, a
bank, securities or other financial account in a foreign country shall report such relationship to the
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue for each year in which such relationship exists, and shall
provide such information as shall be specified in a reporting form .... "); see also STEVEN MARK
LEVY, FEDERAL MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATION: BANKING, CORPORATE AND SECURITIES
COMPLIANCE § 3.02[B] (2003 & Supp. 2011-12) (explaining that Title I of the Bank Secrecy Act,
codified in Title 12 of the United States Code, requires banks to maintain certain records and that Title
II, codified in Title 31 of the United States Code, requires certain reporting of "secret foreign bank
transactions").
129 I.R.S. Form 1040, Schedule B, Line 7a.
'3 I.R.C. § 6038D (Supp. 2011). The provision is effective for tax years beginning after the date
of enactment, March 18, 2010. Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147,
124 Stat. 71 § 51 1(c) (2010); see also TIGTA Report, supra note 93 (contrasting § 6038D and FBAR
requirements). This Article focuses on the banking-law-based FBAR requirement rather than the §
6038D requirement because FBAR reporting more clearly fits the high-penalty model which is the
focus of this Article, assuming that a willfiilness-based penalty is a credible possibility. The basic §
6038D penalty is $10,000, increasing to a maximum of $50,000 after notification by the Secretary.
I.R.C. § 6038D(d). Another provision increases the substantial underpayment penalty for any
transaction involving an undisclosed foreign financial asset from twenty percent to forty percent.
I.R.C. § 66620)(3). But these penalties do not approach the size of FBAR penalties such as the fifty-
percent-of-account-value willful civil penalty, and the possibility of imprisonment. See infra note 141
and accompanying text.
131 See LEVY, supra note 128, § 3.02 ("The grande dame of money laundering regulation is the
statute commonly known as the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970.").
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depositor may fail to pay taxes on the income from the accounts.1 32 The
second and third issues are tax enforcement concerns. The Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network ("FinCEN") division of the Treasury had
enforcement responsibility for FBAR compliance until 2003, when
enforcement authority was transferred to the IRS under a Memorandum of
Understanding. 133
The FBAR regulations are broad. They require "[e]ach person subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States ... having a financial interest in, or
signature or other authority over, a bank, securities or other financial
account" to file a report. 134 Under a de minimis rule, a report is required if
the aggregate value of the financial accounts exceeds $10,000 at any time
during the calendar year. 135  Filings are required of entities such as
corporations, partnerships, and trusts, 136 and with respect to holdings in or
through corporations, partnerships, trusts, or other entities.1 37  Taxpayers
must report information that should be readily available to them: in
132 The legislative history of the 1970 enactment of the Bank Secrecy Act includes a concern for
these tax evasion issues. Swiss bank accounts are not a recent phenomenon. "One of the most
damaging effects of an American's use of secret foreign financial facilities is its undermining of the
fairness of our tax laws. Secret foreign financial facilities, particularly in Switzerland, are available
only to the wealthy. To open a secret Swiss account normally requires a substantial deposit, but such
an account offers a convenient means of evading U.S. taxes .... [I]t is grossly unfair to leave the secret
foreign bank account open as a convenient avenue of tax evasion." H.R. Rep. No. 91-975 (1970),
reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4394, 4397-98.
"' See 31 C.F.R. § 103.56(g); IRS News Release IR 2003-48 (Apr. 10, 2003); see also Letter
from New York State Bar Association to Neal S. Wolin, Deputy Secretary, Department of the Treasury,
et al. (July 17, 2009), available at LEXIS, Tax Notes library, 2009 TNT 137-13, at nn.6-7 and
accompanying text (describing delegation of authority to the IRS).
114 31 C.F.R. § 103.24(a) (2010).
135 Treasury Department Form 90-22.1 Instructions, General Instructions, Who Must File an
FBAR [hereinafter FBAR Instructions].
136 An entity account may be required to be reported because of a U.S. person's financial interest
in or signatory authority over such account. See FBAR Instructions, supra note 135, General
Definitions, Financial Interest & Signature Authority; see also BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE
LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATE & GIFTS 65.6.4 (2011). Various other
requirements to report ownership in and transactions with foreign entities also exist. See, e.g., I.R.S.
Instructions for Form 5471, Category 3 Filer (requiring the filing Form 5471 for U.S. persons owning
stock in foreign corporations meeting the ten percent requirement); Treasury Department Form 5472,
General Instructions, Who Must File (requiring the filing of Form 5472 for corporations having
reportable transactions with foreign or domestic related parties); Treasury Department Form 3520-A,
Part III Foreign Trust Balance Sheet, 2010 Foreign Grantor Trust Owner Statement, & 2010 Foreign
Grantor Trust Beneficiary Statement (requiring an accounting of assets held in a foreign trust);
Treasury Department Form 8865, Schedule A-I (Certain Partners of Foreign Partnership) & Schedule
N (Transactions Between Controlled Foreign Partnership and Partners or Other Related Entities)
(requiring reporting of transactions with foreign partnerships).
131 See I.R.S., FAQs Regarding Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR)-
Financial Accounts (Sept. 30, 2011, 8:00 PM), http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/
article/0,,id=210249,00.html (requiring persons with a financial interest in, or signatory authority over,
a foreign commingled fund such as a mutual fund to file an FBAR).
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particular, the existence and size of an offshore account.138 The focus here
is on the core requirement to report bank accounts financially owned by
individual U.S. taxpayers directly or through a corporation or other entity
over which the U.S. owner has signatory authority. 3 9
There are several civil and criminal statutory penalties specified for
FBAR violations. 140  This analysis focuses on the civil willful violation
penalty, which equals the greater of $100,000 or fifty percent of the
balance in the account "at the time of the violation." 141 This is a huge
potential penalty, and significantly more than before the statute was
amended in 2004.142
B. Applying the High-Penalty Analytical Framework to the FBAR
1. Penalty Credibility
Part III argued that penalty credibility is one factor necessary to
support the success of a high-penalty regime as a deterrence, separation,
and/or signaling mechanism. In the case of the FBAR, the government has
done a good job so far of establishing the credibility of government-
enforced penalties in the minds of taxpayers. Government efforts to
articulate and publicize applicable penalties crystallized in litigation
relating to accounts at the Swiss bank UBS, and in the administration of
the 2009 FBAR voluntary disclosure program. In particular, the
government's strategy has leveraged availability bias and persuaded
taxpayers of the likelihood of imposition of large civil penalties. The
government now faces the task of maintaining momentum.
A central purpose of audit and compliance publicity is to increase
138 The FBAR form requires the reporting of the maximum amount in the account during the year
reported. FBAR Instructions, supra note 135, Part II: Information on Financial Account(s) Owned
Separately.
139 Final regulations do not disturb the FBAR filing requirement in this paradigm case. See
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network: Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations--Reports
of Foreign Financial Accounts, 76 Fed. Reg. 10234 (Feb. 24, 2011) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. Part
1010).
140 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5321(a)(1), 5322 (a)-(b) (2006) (specifying civil and criminal penalties).
There is also a voluminous list of possible penalties for tax evasion and other offenses that may be
linked to failure to file an FBAR. See I.R.S., Voluntary Disclosure Questions and Answers, Questions
and Answers 14 and 15, available at www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=210027,00.html (listing
possible civil and criminal penalties for not disclosing voluntarily and being charged by the I.R.S.) (last
visited Dec. 16, 2011).
14 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(C)-(D); see also id. § 5321(a)(5)(B)(i)-(ii) (implementing a $10,000
civil penalty with a reasonable cause exception); id. § 5322(a)-(b) (implementing criminal penalties
including imprisonment); see generally BITrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 136, at 65.6.2 (summarizing
penalties).
142 The legislative history indicates that the increased penalty responded to the Treasury's
reporting of widespread disregard for the FBAR filing requirement. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON
TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 108TH CONGRESS 377-78
(2005) (providing explanation for section 821 of the Act, codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5321).
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taxpayers' or tax preparers' perception of the risk of detection. 143  These
efforts should leverage the well-established cognitive availability bias,
which prompts us to estimate the "likelihood of an event on the basis of
how quickly instances or other associations come to mind."' 44  Studies
support the existence of an "indirect" audit effect related to taxpayers'
decisions to comply because they hear news of others getting caught. 145
Associations come more quickly to mind if the stories are familiar,
146
so a publicity strategy should effectively communicate to taxpayers that
people like them get caught by the IRS or settle with the IRS because of a
fear of being caught. 147 The offshore account plea bargain publicity since
2008 has done a nice job of providing this kind of availability bias-based
communication. It started with a scandalous news item: ex-UBS
investment banker Bradley Birkenfeld's revelation of elaborate James-
Bond-worthy secrecy practices in the cross-border private banking division
143 See, e.g., Andreoni et al., supra note 12, at 844-46 (summarizing tax compliance studies
associating a high subjective probability of detection with significantly higher compliance rates).
1'4 Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 22, at 39-41 (quoting SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR,
SOCIAL COGNITION 384 (2d ed. 1991)); see also Joshua D. Blank, In Defense of Taxpayer Privacy, 61
EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 127) (describing heuristics relevant to tax compliance
including anchoring and availability biases); Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, Toward an Agenda
for Behavioral Public Finance, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 15-18 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel
Slemrod eds., 2006) (explaining the importance of behavioral science to tax policy).
145 See, e.g., James Aim et al., Getting the Word Out: Enforcement Information Dissemination
and Compliance Behavior, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 392, 401 (2009) (reporting results of laboratory study
showing that subject-to-subject communication about audit outcomes significantly affects compliance
decisions); Jeffrey A. Dubin, Criminal Investigation Enforcement Activities and Taxpayer
Noncompliance, 35 PUB. FIN. REV. 500, 516, 518 (2007) (concluding from a longitudinal study of state
segmented data that audits and criminal investigations significantly influence compliance behavior);
see also James Alm & Mohammad Yunus, Spatiality and Persistence in U.S. Individual Income Tax
Compliance, 62 NAT'L TAX J. 101, 121 (2009) (finding correlation between geographic residence and
evasion behavior). Estimates of the ratio between the dollars brought in because of other taxpayers'
compliance compared to the additional collections resulting from the audit itself are in the range of 11
or 15:1. See ALAN H. PLUMLEY, I.R.S. PUBLICATION 1916: THE DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE: ESTIMATING THE IMPACTS OF TAX POLICY, ENFORCEMENT, AND IRS
RESPONSIVENESS 35 (1996) (estimating the indirect audit effect at 11.6 times the direct audit effect);
see also Dubin, supra, at 519 (reporting result of 15.1:1 under simulation of doubling audit rates).
146 See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 270-71 (1984) (noting
"retrieval biases," "strength of association" biases, and ease of imagining events as biasing factors);
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability,
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 163, 176 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,
1982) (explaining that individuals estimate the likelihood of an event based in large part on other
instances they know of and the similarity of those instances to their own circumstances); see also
Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and
Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1179 (2004) ("[C]ues that are prominent or catch our attention
are more likely to activate associated categories and schemas.").
147 See Morse, supra note 16, at 510 ("[An audit] publicity campaign featuring more typical
taxpayers would have more salience.").
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at UBS. 148 Birkenfeld disclosed that UBS had deliberately designed
workarounds to avoid the requirements to disclose U.S. account holders
that were built into the "qualified intermediary," or QI, agreement that
UBS had entered into with the U.S. government.
1 49
Birkenfeld's information led to a U.S. criminal fraud investigation of
UBS, which ended with a $780 million fine and a deferred prosecution
agreement in February 2009.150 The U.S. government then submitted a
request for enforcement of a broad subpoena to disclose the names of over
50,000 U.S. clients of UBS. 15' This caused significant difficulties in
Switzerland because of the direct conflict between the disclosure request
and secrecy laws, which the Swiss government, as well as Swiss bankers
148 Birkenfeld said, for example, that "he once transported diamonds, bought with client money
abroad, into the United States in a tube of toothpaste." Mark Hosenball & Evan Thomas, Cracking the
Vault, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 23, 2009, at 32. Birkenfeld pled guilty in June 2008 to conspiring to help
wealthy American Igor Olenicoff evade taxes. Lynnley Browning, U.S. Is Said to Expand Tax Inquiry,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2008, at BI. In August 2009, he received a 40-month prison sentence. Joanna
Chung, Former UBS Banker Given Prison Term, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2009.
149 The QI rules mainly intend to facilitate information transfer about non-U.S. account holders to
permit accurate withholding on U.S.-source investment income (e.g., in order to comply with treaty
rules). See Susan C. Morse & Stephen E. Shay, Qualified Intermediary Status: A New U.S.
Withholding Role for Foreign Financial Institutions Under Final U.S. Withholding Regulations, 27
TAx MGMT. INT'L J. 331, 331-33 (1998) (noting U.S. account holder targets of QI rules); see also
REUVEN S. AvI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 27, 28, 68-77 (2007) (outlining exceptions to the default thirty percent
U.S. withholding tax on U.S.-source investment income). Over 5000 foreign banks, such as UBS,
Credit Suisse, and Deutsche Bank, have signed QI agreements with the U.S. Letter from New York
State Bar Association to Sen. Max Baucus et al. (Sept. 10, 2009) [hereinafter NYSBA Sept. 10, 2009
Letter], available at LEXIS, Tax Notes library, 2009 TNT 175-67.
Importantly, there is no presumption of U.S. status for purposes of backup withholding with
respect to gross security sale proceeds. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.6049-5(d)(3)(ii) (2010). In addition, the QI
agreement includes a less-than-airtight provision that requires foreign banks to disclose U.S. account
holders. See Rev. Proc. 2000-12, 2000 C.B. 387 § 6.01. It was this U.S. disclosure requirement that
UBS helped clients to deliberately plan around. According to internal documents, UBS recommended
to U.S. clients that they hold accounts through a nominee blocker corporation in a tax haven, thus
ensuring the treatment of the account holder as non-U.S. under 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.1441-1(c)(3) (which
defines foreign corporation as a foreign beneficial owner) or divest U.S. assets, perhaps trading in U.S.
treasuries for British gilts, thus following a workaround suggested by the QI agreement itself. See Rev.
Proc. 2000-12, 2000 C.B. 387 § 6.02; see also UBS, QUALIFIED INTERMEDIARY SYSTEM: U.S.
WITHHOLDING TAX ON DIVIDENDS AND INTEREST INCOME FROM U.S. SECURITIES 1 (Oct. 2004) ("A
QI has to ensure that US Persons ... either declare themselves to the US tax authorities ... or are no
longer permitted to invest in US securities.").
150 Lynnley Browning, US. Reports Agreement with UBS in Tax Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,
2009, at B3.
151 Id. The U.S. John Doe summons request did not discriminate based on the size of the account.
See Memorandum in Support of Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve John Doe Summons at 8, In re
Tax Liabilities of John Does (No. 08-21864) (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2008) (describing John Doe class as
any U.S. taxpayer with "signature or other authority ... with respect to any financial accounts," except
for taxpayers who had supplied UBS with Forms W-9 and been subject to Form 1099 reporting).
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and their clients, took very seriously.'5 2  In August 2009, after the
intervention of the Swiss government as amicus in the case and top-level
negotiations, the civil case settled under an agreement requiring UBS to
disclose over 4000 names through the information exchange provisions of
the treaty between the United States and Switzerland.153  After
considerable debate, the Swiss parliament approved the agreement in June
2010, and Switzerland's highest court later confirmed the constitutionality
of the disclosure.'
54
Meanwhile, the U.S. government ran a voluntary disclosure program
aimed at offshore account holders, which resulted in 15,000 applications
by October 2009.155 A follow-up voluntary disclosure program launched
152 See, e.g., Haig Simonian, Swiss Minister Defiant over Demand for UBS Names, FIN. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 2009 (describing the political uproar in Switzerland over the requested disclosure).
"5 See Browning, supra note 150, at B3 (noting agreement by Swiss government to "turn over
about 5,000 names"). The Swiss government argued that Swiss bank secrecy laws prohibited UBS
from complying with the summons and that the information request should be processed through
applicable treaty provisions. Brief for Government of Switzerland as Amici Curiae Supporting
Defendants at 13-15 United States v. UBS AG (No. 09-CV-20423) (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2009). The
settlement with the Swiss government requires the U.S. to submit information requests under Article 26
of the U.S.-Swiss treaty which permits the exchange of information necessary to prevent tax fraud. Id.
at 11-13. Historically, the treaty has not been used for broad summons requests undertaken without
previous specific suspicions about a particular taxpayer. Id. at 15-19.
154 Lynnley Browning, Swiss Approve Deal for UBS to Reveal U.S. Clients Suspected of Tax
Evasion, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2010, at B3; Jaclyn Belczyk, Switzerland High Court Upholds UBS
Disclosure of Client Information, JURIST (Jul. 15, 2011, 11:46 AM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/
2011/07/switzerland-high-court-upholds-ubs-disclosure-of-client-information.php. This followed a
decision by the Swiss Federal Administrative Court that the failure to file a W-9 with UBS for
transmission to the U.S. tax authorities did not constitute "tax fraud and the like" and therefore did not
meet a requirement under a 1996 treaty for an exception to bank secrecy protection. See Daniel Pruzin,
Switzerland for Now to Hand Over Data on Only 250 Secret Accounts with UBS, BNA TAX
MANAGEMENT WEEKLY REPORT 144-45 (Feb. 1, 2010). In July 2011, the lower court's decision was
reversed, preventing UBS account holders from claiming damages for breach of bank secrecy from
UBS. Swiss Court Says was Right to Give U.S. Bank Data, REUTERS (July 15, 2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/15/ubs-idUSLDE76El 2W20110715 (noting the court's view
that the U.S. indictment that could have resulted absent the Swiss regulator's order for the handover of
the information "would have led to the bankruptcy of the bank which in turn would have caused serious
and virtually uncontrollable economic repercussions for Switzerland .... "). As of August 2010, the
IRS had received information regarding about 2000 UBS clients. Lynnley Browning, I.R.S. to Drop
Suit Against UBS over Tax Havens, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2010, at B6.
155 See Memorandum from Linda E. Stiff, Deputy I.R.S. Commissioner for Services and
Enforcement, to Commissioner, Large and Mid-Size Business Division and Commissioner, Small
Business/Self-Employed Division (March 23, 2009) (setting forth settlement terms); I.R.S. News
Release IR 2009-84 (Sept. 21, 2009) (extending deadline to October 15, 2009); see also Marie Sapirie,
New Era of Enforcement Follows UBS Saga, 59 TAX NOTES INT'L 501 (2010) (noting 14,700
disclosures under the program).
The 2009 program followed the offshore credit card initiative of 2002-03, which sought
information from payment processors such as MasterCard and Visa, see Rev. Proc. 2003-11, 2003-4
I.R.B. 311, and which culminated in only ten or so prosecuted cases, plus settled cases that did not get
publicized. See Heather Bennett, IRS Offshore Compliance Initiative Collects US $170 Million So Far,
102 TA NOTES 517 (2004) (reporting that the initiative collected 1300 applications and $170 million).
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in February 2011.156 During the same time period, the Department of
Justice used the UBS case and information to support the high-profile
criminal prosecution of several offshore account holders, and it obtained a
number of plea bargains, which then supported well-executed availability-
bias-based publicity. The publicity was not supported by huge numbers of
convicted taxpayers. But their stories were well-covered by the national
media and presented a high-availability story of average rich people getting
caught. 157  Reports released while the voluntary disclosure program was
pending indicated that smaller UBS clients were included on the list
selected for disclosure.
158
The government chose a high monetary penalty benchmark for its
2008-09 and 2011 special offshore account voluntary disclosure programs.
It used twenty percent of account value in 2008-09 and twenty-five
percent in 2011 as the price for entering the voluntary disclosure
program.159 This represents a discount from the statutory civil willfulness
penalty of fifty percent of the account balance for each annual failure to
file. 160 But it is not clear that a court would have upheld the application of
It was considered a limited success. See, e.g., JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, TAX COMPLIANCE
AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO OFFSHORE ACCOUNTS AND ENTITIES 48-49 (Mar. 30,
2009) (reporting the view that the lack of parallel enforcement actions and publicity limited the success
of the 2003 program). In general the 2002-03 initiative did not face a bank secrecy obstacle, since it
targeted U.S. payment processors. See, e.g., Dorsey v. United States, 2004-1 U.S.T.C. 50,164 83,
231-32 (D. Md. 2004) (refusing to quash summons under § 7602; bank secrecy issue not raised).
156 See I.R.S. News Release, IR 2011-14 (Feb. 8,2011).
157 See Morse, supra note *, at 58 (citing a string of news stories).
158 See Laura Saunders, IRS Extends Deadline to Declare Foreign Accounts, WALL ST. J., Sept.
22, 2009, at Cl (reporting "no discernible pattern as to which customers were selected" for required
disclosure under the UBS settlement and repeating practitioner's comment that "[s]everal of our clients
with 'plain vanilla' accounts well under $1 million have gotten these letters"). The U.S. John Doe
summons request did not discriminate based on the size of the account. See Memorandum in Support
of Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve John Doe Summons, supra note 151, at 8 (describing John Doe
class as any U.S. taxpayer with "signature or other authority . . . with respect to any financial
accounts," except for taxpayers who had supplied UBS with Forms W-9 and been subject to Form 1099
reporting).
159 In addition to requiring taxpayers to file returns going back six years and pay all back taxes,
interest, and either accuracy or delinquency penalties, participants in the 2008-09 offshore account
voluntary disclosure program paid penalties of twenty percent of the account balance for the year (of
the six years covered) with the highest balance. See Memorandum from Linda E. Stiff, supra note 155
(setting forth settlement terms). In 2011, a lower 12.5% penalty was also established for smaller
accounts whose value did not exceed $75,000 in any covered year. I.R.S. News Release IR 2011-14
(Feb. 8, 2011). State taxes and penalties may also apply. See I.R.S., Voluntary Disclosures: Questions
and Answers, supra note 140, at Question 12. See generally LEANDRA LEDERMAN & STEPHEN W.
MAZZA, TAX CONTROVERSIES: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 80-92 (3d ed. 2009) (describing penalties
for civil tax violations and defenses).
' See 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(c)(i)(I)-(II) (2006) (providing for a penalty of the greater of
$100,000 or fifty percent of the balance in the account at the time of the violation). Prior to 2004, the
maximum penalty for a willful violation was the lesser of $100,000 or the account balance at the time
of violation. See BrTTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 136, at 65.6 n.87 (describing 2004 Congressional
action).
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such a willfulness penalty, particularly for failures to file before the
government had widely publicized the FBAR requirement.
Under the holding in Cheek v. United States,161 a "willful" violation of
a legal duty to file a tax form generally requires that the defendant know of
the legal duty.162  It is conceivable, given the historic lack of publicity
about, and enforcement of, the FBAR filing requirements, that a defendant
might be able to show a lack of willfulness. 163  One circuit court case,
decided under the Cheek standard, rejected an "ostrich" defense theory in
an FBAR filing case, but it involved egregious facts.
164
The government apparently intends to apply the penalty across the
board. 65  It has declined to recognize a distinction between business
accounts and savings and investment accounts, 166 and an anticipated
reduction to a five percent penalty apparently meant to apply to inherited
accounts is reportedly not granted. 167  Guidance accompanying the 2011
program explicitly stated that the twenty-five percent penalty would not be
subject to negotiation or the discretion of IRS personnel.' 68  Despite the
uncertain applicability of the willfulness standard, the government
61 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
162 See id. at 201-02 ("Willfulness, as construed by our prior decisions in criminal tax cases,
requires the Government to prove that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant
knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty.").
163 See, e.g., Feingold, supra note 97, at 605 (arguing that many FBAR nonfilers failed to file due
to ignorance of the requirement).
164 See United States v. Sturman, 951 F.2d 1466, 1476-77 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that actions
taken to conceal assets from the government, including the use of different corporations to transfer
funds, together with admitted "knowledge of and failure to answer a question concerning signature
authority at foreign banks on Schedule B of his income tax return... provid[ed] a sufficient basis to
establish willfulness on the part of the defendant"). But see Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147
(1994) (reversing the conviction of a defendant who avoided the Bank Secrecy Act's cash transaction
reporting requirement by purchasing a series of cashier's checks, on the grounds that although the
defendant knew of the reporting requirement, he did not know that structuring the cashier check
purchases was illegal).
165 See, e.g., Memorandum from Monica L. Baker, Dir., SBSE Examination & Rosemary Sereti,
Dir., Int'l Individual Compliance to All OVDI Exam'rs Re: Use of Discretion on 2009 OVDI Cases
(Mar. 1, 2011) (stating that discretion to reduce penalty from twenty percent in 2009 OVDI program
would be allowed in restricted cases only, such as when the possibility of a reduction had already been
discussed).
166 IRS, Voluntary Disclosure: Questions and Answers, supra note 140, at Question 32.
167 In guidance, the IRS stated that a five percent penalty might apply to accounts that the
taxpayer "did not open or cause ... to be opened, [where] there has been no activity. . . during the
period the account.., was controlled by the taxpayer, and. . . all applicable U.S. taxes have been paid
on the funds [deposited] in the accounts." Memorandum from Linda E. Stiff, supra note 155, at 2. An
inherited account, for example, might fit these criteria. However, practitioners report that as a practical
matter taxpayers cannot persuade the government to apply only a five percent penalty. See, e.g.,
Remarks of Frank Agostino, Kathryn Keneally & Bryan Skarlatos, The Prosecution and Defense of
Offshore Bank Accounts, ABA Tax Section Teleconference & Live Audio Webcast (Mar. 3, 2010).
161 See IRS, Voluntary Disclosure: Questions and Answers, supra note 140, at Question 35
(providing, however, that the assessed penalties would not exceed the maximum penalties that would
be assessed under law outside the voluntary disclosure initiative).
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managed to establish twenty percent, and then twenty-five percent, of the
account value as a credible penalty-in other words, it successfully
publicized that penalty level in its program, and voluntarily disclosing
taxpayers accepted it as a benchmark.
For the typical offshore account holder, news about indictments and
plea bargains of the merely very wealthy, rather than the Forbes 400, may
have salience and tap effectively into availability bias, but in order for the
news to be effective it must continue. 169  The IRS should continue to
publicize different kinds of taxpayers that have gotten caught to the extent
it legally can. 170  The government's apparent focus on marshaling simple
and easily decided (or plea bargained) charges makes sense, as does its
emphasis on continuing its prosecution, plea bargain, and publicity
program, 17' and on covering banks other than UBS.
17 2
The government appears aware of the need to broaden the net beyond
UBS and has instituted criminal proceedings against another large bank,
HSBC, and at least two of its clients, 173 as well as against Credit Suisse
169 See supra note 146 and accompanying text (describing the importance of recalled similar
events to an individual's probability estimates).
170 Publicizing taxpayers who have been caught is likely more important that publicizing the audit
rate or the compliance rate, both of which draw mixed results in terms of their ability to promote
additional compliance. Taxpayers may interpret the audit rate either as communicating that audit
activity exists or communicating that an audit is too unlikely to worry about. Cf Aim et al., supra note
145, at 401 (noting conflicting results for "official" publication of audit information in laboratory
study). The IRS does publish audit rates, though it keeps the factors that affect its audit selection
mechanism secret.
The typically cited problem with publicizing the compliance rate, as opposed to telling stories
about tax cheats who got caught, is the "chump" problem, meaning that taxpayers can interpret the
compliance rate as communicating that "a clever minority cheats" instead of that the strong norm is to
pay one's taxes. Morse, supra note 16, at 506. In one real-life experiment, Minnesota taxpayers
received a letter from the Minnesota Department of Revenue stating that nearly all taxpayers-ninety-
three percent-were compliant. Increased compliance, measured by reference to actual tax returns
filed, was not statistically significant for those who received the letter. The possibility that the
audience will self-identify with or aspire to be part of the "clever minority" makes this a risky strategy.
See Blumenthal et al., supra note 70, at 134.
171 See Alison Bennett, Tax Crimes: Efforts Continuing to Track Down Individuals, Banks Hiding
Offshore Assets, Officials Say, 29 TAX MGMT. WKLY. REP. 100, 100 (Jan. 25, 2010) (noting 150
ongoing offshore account criminal investigations and that "hundreds of taxpayers are still coming in
under IRS's basic procedures for voluntary disclosures"). Plea bargain publicity has continued to
emerge, and continues to feature the average wealthy taxpayer. See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, UBS
Client Pleads Guilty to Tax Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2010, at B4 (reporting guilty plea of Harry
Abrahamsen of Oradell, New Jersey, whose UBS account was allegedly financed by claiming $1.3
million in inflated expenses-which would have produced a tax benefit of perhaps $500,000).
172 See Lee Sheppard, Now What? Dealing With UBS Account Disclosures, 124 TAX NOTES 847,
854 (2009) (suggesting that the IRS should pursue and publicize fifty UBS cases and twenty from other
banks).
173 See Lynnley Browning, US. Widens Tax Inquiry Into HSBC, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2010, at B1
(reporting criminal investigation of London-based bank and two of its clients); David D. Stewart, U.S.
Offshore Enforcement Likely to Focus on Asia, Practitioners Say, TAX NOTES (2010), available at
LEXIS, TNT library, 2010 TNT 64-1 (reporting on David Rosenbloom and Scott Michel's efforts to
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bankers. On the heels of the 2011 announcement of the follow-up
voluntary disclosure program came news that the U.S. offshore account
investigations now also targeted Asian and Israeli banks. These targets
presumably emerged from information provided by taxpayers about
offshore accounts on FBAR forms submitted under the 2009 voluntary
disclosure program or by UBS through its disclosed accounts. 174  In
November 2011, following the indictment of several Credit Suisse bankers,
the Swiss bank agreed to disclose some U.S. clients' names to the IRS.t 75
The IRS is fortunate in this case that various media outlets are
following this story closely, because § 6103 of the Code, which prohibits
the IRS from disclosing confidential taxpayer "return information, 176
limits the government's direct publicity efforts. 177  The enumerated
exceptions in the statute do not even include explicit permission for the
IRS to publicize return information that has already been disclosed
publicly, whether through a posted lien, civil or criminal litigation,
taxpayer discussion of the case in a public forum, or otherwise. 178
However, in light of the case law 179 the IRS has become comfortable with
warn the financial industry in Hong Kong and Singapore of the likelihood of UBS-like investigations in
Asia).
'74 See Kara Scannell & Haig Simonian, U.S. Probe Into Tax Evasion Widens, FIN. TIMES, Feb.
27, 2011 (reporting connection between UBS information and new investigations).
"' See Haig Simonian, Credit Suisse to Hand Over U.S. Clients' Names, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 8,
201 1.17 I.R.C. § 6103(2) (2006). The statute defines "return information" very broadly and it
"includes any information developed or obtained by the IRS during the course of an audit or
investigation of the taxpayer, as well as the mere fact that the taxpayer's return has been or is being
audited or investigated." Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 KAN. L. REV.
1065, 1091 (2003). A series of exceptions permits disclosure of return information in certain specific
circumstances, which include several third-party disclosure permissions necessary to effective
administration. For example, the IRS may disclose information in connection with judicial
proceedings, I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4), under certain circumstances to obtain relevant information, id § 6103
(k)(6), or to put an interested party on notice, id. § 6103(e).
"' See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2) (permitting disclosures to the general public when it publicizes
"data in a form which cannot be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a
particular taxpayer"); id. § 6103(k)(l) (allowing disclosure "to permit inspection of any accepted offer-
in-compromise under section 7122").
171 See, e.g., Mazza, supra note 176, at 1121 ("The IRS's current efforts to communicate strong
and meaningful deterrence messages are hampered by the lack of an exception in section 6103
permitting disclosure of return information relevant to criminal tax proceedings.").
179 The circuit courts have divided into three camps. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits have adopted a
"public records" exception that permits the IRS to publicize taxpayer information that has been
disclosed in litigation, including in an indictment or other filing that precedes a final determination.
See Rowley v. United States, 76 F.3d 796, 801 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that taxpayer's return
information loses its confidentiality through filing and recording of a judicial lien, and that the IRS may
republish it); William E. Schrambling Accounting Co. v. United States, 937 F.2d 1485, 1488-89 (9th
Cir. 1991) (concluding that the filing of a tax lien destroyed confidentiality); Lampert v. United States,
854 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1988) (focusing on press releases relating to charges and final resolutions
and declining to use a "strict, technical reading of the statute" because such a reading would "defeat the
purposes of the statute"). The Fourth Circuit has expressed support for the technical statutory reading
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the strategy of posting press releases on its website.180  Categorical
publicity or fictional advertising are also options open to the IRS under
current law. 1
81
2. Detection and Information Strategies
A key possible weakness in a high-penalty regime is the possibility
that taxpayers who wish to game the system may pretend to be
compliers) 82  Excellent audit of FBAR filers is therefore essential, as is
publicity of successful audits. The availability of data and the nature of the
FBAR filing group as a small population with established publicity
avenues can shape the detection strategy in this case.
In the short term, audit filters must derive from statistical models
containing the information on FBAR filings themselves. The good news is
that the taxpayers targeted by the FBAR filing requirement are not an
enormous group-perhaps one or two million. The actual audit rate, for
wealthier taxpayers--6.42% for fiscal year 2009 for taxpayers with annual
income in excess of one million dollars-exceeds substantially the 1.03%
rate for individual taxpayers on average. 183  And the IRS has formed a
rejected by the Ninth Circuit and holds that no disclosure of return information is permitted regardless
of the public disclosure of such information elsewhere. Mallas v. United States, 993 F.2d 1111, 1120-
21 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding a violation of § 6103 under a strict statutory reading and on facts, including
the disclosure of other facts than those that appeared in the court opinion, which was subsequently
unanimously reversed by an en banc Fourth Circuit decision). The Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits
have adopted forms of an "immediate source" exception, which permits disclosure if the IRS in fact
drew the relevant information from court or other public proceedings and not from inside agency
information. E.g., Rice v. United States, 166 F.3d 1088, 1091 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding no § 6103
violation where IRS press official had obtained press release information from public findings and trial
and sentencing proceedings); Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1325-26 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding a
violation of § 6103 where information disclosed by IRS employee "came either from [the taxpayer's]
return file or from information 'in [the IRS employee's] head'); Thomas v. United States, 890 F.2d 18,
21 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that § 6103 "is not a prohibition of any kind against the disclosure of
opinions of the Tax Court"); cf Mazza, supra note 176, at 1105-14, 1121-22 (analyzing case law and
related cases in other contexts considering when public disclosure diminishes privacy rights and
describing and evaluating Joint Committee and Treasury recommendations "which essentially adopt the
Ninth Circuit's public records exception").
180 See Offshore Tax Avoidance and IRS Compliance Efforts, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/
article/0,,id=1 10092,00.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2011) (announcing the names of UBS clients found
guilty of various tax-related offenses).
181 Joshua Blank and Daniel Levin have recently shown that the federal government appears to
pursue a strategic publicity strategy by issuing a significantly higher volume of press releases during
the weeks before April 15 of each year. Joshua D. Blank & Daniel Z. Levin, When is Tax Enforcement
Publicized?, 30 VA. TAX REV. 1, 4 (2010). In a related article, Blank argues that taxpayer privacy
allows the government to select what information may be disclosed, thus shaping the manipulation of
taxpayers' perceptions of enforcement. See Blank, supra note 144 (manuscript at 132-33).
'82 See Raskolknikov, supra note 13, at 724 (noting that high noncompliance regime penalties will
induce garners, particularly aggressive garners, to try to hide behind the compliance regime).
183 See IRS, FIscAL YEAR 2009 ENFORCEMENT RESULTS 2, 3, available at http://www.irs.gov/
newsroom/article/0,,id=217442,00.html (examining individual return closures and coverage rates).
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special group to coordinate offshore account examinations for high-net-
worth individuals. 84 The small size and high-net-worth characteristics of
the target population also facilitate effective publicity of the likelihood that
non-compliers masquerading as compliers will be caught. In fact, the
government has a proven publicity strategy: the distribution of press
releases on which national and international newspapers then report.
The bad news is that the IRS is constrained by the fact that the FBAR
is a creature of banking law. Because taxpayer information is confidential,
"when the IRS is operating solely on its designated authority ...while
enforcing FBAR provisions, it is precluded from using tax return or tax
return information or information systems derived from that
information.' ', 8  The shadow FBAR filing required under § 6038D of the
Internal Revenue Code is intended to solve this problem. The IRS can
develop a program to match automatically § 6038D data with other tax
return information.
18 6
The possible future availability of third-party data should shape the
way in which the government collects FBAR and § 6038D data now. In
particular, data fields should be standardized for FBAR and FATCA
filings. 187 And they should be simple, especially given the potential global
nature of an ultimately successful offshore-account information-reporting
project.1 88 The essential contents of an FBAR or § 6038D form filed on
behalf of an individual can be reduced to four information fields: taxpayer
identity, which should often reduce to a TIN; the identity of the financial
institution at which the account is held; the maximum value of the account
for the year; and the account number.' 89
Even if electronic filing-which would require statutory
184 See David D. Stewart, New IRS Group to Examine Wealthier Individuals Using Offshore
Arrangements for Evasion, TAX NOTES (2009), available at LEXIS, Tax Notes library, 2009 TNT-168-
1.
185 TIGTA Report, supra note 93, at 8.
86 See id at 9-10 (discussing planned § 6038D guidance).
187 Robert Foley of State Street Bank has suggested that taxpayers at least be able to elect
electronic filing, citing in part the ability of the IRS to more effectively use electronically submitted
data. E-mail from Robert J. Foley to Notice Comments (Aug. 27, 2009), available at LEXIS, Tax
Notes library, 2009 TNT 173-19.
188 See Itai Grinberg, Beyond FATCA: An Evolutionary Moment for the International Tax System
32-54 (Feb. 16, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfrn?abstractid=1996752 (setting forth arguments in favor of
automatic global tax reporting rather than anonymous withholding).
189 Boxes 3-13 capture the identity of the individual taxpayer; box 15 asks for the maximum value
of the account during the year reported; box 18 asks for the account number or other designation; and
boxes 17 and 19-23 identify the foreign financial institution. Treasury Department Form TD F 90-
22.1.
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authorization' 90 -is not yet feasible, assigning numeric codes for these
fields would facilitate data entry and sorting based on paper source
documents. For example, foreign financial institutions should have
identification numbers to be used on FBAR and other filings. 9' Without
these simplification and automation measures, the government may face a
situation where it has gobs of paper FBAR information about taxpayers
and does not know what to do with it.'
92
3. The Close Substitute of Quiet Disclosure
As Section III.C discussed, the problem of close substitutes can also
bar a high-penalty regime from achieving its deterrence, separation, and/or
signaling goals. This is an issue for the FBAR filing requirement. The
possibility of a "quiet disclosure" option may exist as a close substitute
alternative to voluntary disclosure.
"Quiet disclosure" is the practice of simply filing amended tax returns
for the years in question. 193  It is not endorsed by any government
guidance, in contrast to official "voluntary disclosure," which is described
in the Internal Revenue Manual.1 94 Voluntary disclosure includes a list of
conditions and features an undertaking by the IRS to consider the fact of
disclosure when deciding whether to forward a case to the Department of
Justice for criminal prosecution, such as for tax evasion. In practice, it is
generally thought that voluntary disclosure prevents criminal
prosecution.
195
Even though quiet disclosure is not officially endorsed, 196 it is a fairly
190 I.R.C. § 6011 (e) (2006) generally specifies the Secretary's ability to require electronic filing.
As amended, it gives broad authority to require financial institutions to file returns relating to
withholding tax for which the institution is liable under §§ 1461 or 1474(a). Id § 6011 (e).
19' The applicable regulation delegates to the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to prescribe
the information that must be listed on the form. 31 C.F.R. § 103.24(a) (2010). Others have proposed
uniform numbering. E.g., William L. Burke, Tax Information Reporting and Compliance in the Cross-
Border Context, 27 VA. TAX REv. 399, 411, 415 (2007) (suggesting that each foreign corporation be
assigned a distinctive taxpayer identification number that must be used in all subsequent filings).
192 Cf Blank, supra note 49, at 1632 (describing the problem of overdisclosure under tax shelter
disclosure rules).
193 See Treas. Reg. § 1.45 1-1(a) (2004) ("If a taxpayer ascertains that an item should have been
included in gross income in a prior taxable year, he should, if within the period of limitation, file an
amended return and pay any additional tax due."); LEDERMAN & MAZZA, supra note 159, at 90
(describing generally the amended return practice).
'94 IRS, IRM 1.45 1-1(a) (Dec. 2, 2009).
195 See, e.g., Letter from Stuart E. Abrams et al. to The Honorable Douglas H. Shulman, Comm'r
of Internal Revenue & John DiCicco, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice, Tax Div. (Mar.
30, 2010) (asserting that to maintain consistency with taxpayer and practitioner expectations, the
government should ensure that taxpayers who attempt voluntary disclosure in "good faith" are not
prosecuted, even if their disclosures are technically late).
196 See MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN & LESLIE BOOK, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 12.07[3][d]-
[e] (rev. 2d ed. Supp. 2011) (distinguishing quiet disclosure from voluntary disclosure and noting
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well established practice, 97 and taxpayers' expectation that quiet
disclosure offers at least some protection against criminal prosecution is
also entrenched.' 98 The no-penalty quiet disclosure avenue presents a
possible close substitute problem when compared with high-penalty
participation in the offshore account voluntary disclosure program. A
taxpayer's ability to choose quiet disclosure could weaken the FBAR filing
requirement if a taxpayer decides not to file the FBAR form, but rather to
hide his or her offshore account from the government with the intention of
pursuing quiet disclosure later if it looks like he or she will get caught.
This presents a problem for the integrity of the high-penalty FBAR rules
because the voluntary disclosure option does not subject the taxpayer to the
significant willful-failure-to-file-derived penalties that the IRS has applied
to voluntarily disclosing taxpayers. The quiet disclosure option also
weakens the ability of the high-penalty FBAR regime to serve its
deterrence and separation, and, if relevant, signaling functions.
The deterrence power of the FBAR-grounded in taxpayers'
comparison of the risks and rewards of filing and not filing-depends on
taxpayers' belief that failure to file the FBAR will lead to the government
imposing penalties. The no-penalty quiet disclosure option suggests that
there is little cost in failing to file the form initially, and that the taxpayer
may wait to see whether the government seems to have the ability to
discover his or her offshore accounts by other means. If the government
does, then quiet disclosure is an easy after-the-fact solution. 199
The separation goal of a high-penalty system is similarly undermined
by the quiet disclosure option. Compliant taxpayers might choose up-front
compliance, by filing the FBAR; or delayed compliance, through quiet
disclosure. The quiet disclosure option does not clearly identify compliant
taxpayers in the way that filing an FBAR does, and therefore makes it
more difficult for the government to target taxpayer service or tailored
detection strategies to the compliant group. To the extent that the FBAR
rules, despite the fact that they do not require public reporting, include any
reputational signaling component, quiet disclosure also might muffle the
signaling potential of the high-penalty FBAR system, because quiet
disadvantages such as the waiver of Fifth Amendment protection and the possibility of an additional
violation if the amended returns are incorrect).
197 Frank Agostino, Agostino & Associates, Remarks at the Prosecution and Defense of Offshore
Bank Accounts, supra note 167 (describing long-standing "quiet disclosure" approach based on private
practice experience).
198 See LAWRENCE R. JONES, JR., DEALING WITH THE IRS COLLECTION DIVISION § 1412, at 235-
36 (1995) (stating that a taxpayer has a very limited chance of criminal prosecution if failure to file is
corrected by filing tax returns and recommending the resolution of "all questionable items on the
delinquent tax return .. in favor of the IRS").
'99 Of course, the taxpayer's willingness to choose the quiet disclosure option instead of the
voluntary disclosure option, with its more explicit commitment to avoid a criminal prosecution
recommendation, depends in part on the taxpayer's risk aversion.
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disclosure constitutes a competing signal around which taxpayers may
gather instead.
To permit FBAR reporting to function as a high-penalty regime that
promotes deterrence and separation, and perhaps also signaling, this quiet
disclosure close substitute should be removed. The government has taken
the first step toward doing so by saying plainly in its guidance that it will
not respect quiet disclosure-in contrast to voluntary disclosure-as a
reason to refrain from criminal prosecution in the offshore account
context.200 However, as with other elements of a high-penalty regime,
taxpayers' perception is what counts. Therefore, the plan for eliminating a
quiet disclosure option should include appropriate, availability-bias-
motivated publicity, such as publicity of taxpayers subject to significant
penalties despite efforts at quiet disclosure. To date, the government has
not widely publicized any such case.
C. FBAR Reporting as a Successful High-Penalty Regime
The recent enforcement of the FBAR rules has established a good
starting point, due to taxpayer perception of government enforcement, to
serve the high-penalty purposes of deterrence, separation, and signaling.
Tax administrators should continue to work to increase taxpayers'
perception of the credibility of the penalties specified under the FBAR
system, by expanding the reach of their criminal and civil investigations to
other banks and by continuing to publicize cases where taxpayers failed to
file FBARs and got caught. The government should develop its FBAR
audit strategy, with help from the shadow FBAR requirements of § 6038D,
and publicize its ability to detect noncompliant taxpayers attempting to
masquerade as compliant taxpayers by filing incomplete FBARs. Finally,
it should use publicity persuasively to eliminate the close substitute option
of quiet disclosure as a remedy for the failure to file an FBAR in the future.
VII. AN EXPRESSIVE LAW FATCA STRATEGY
A. What FATCA Is
The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, or FATCA, requires non-
U.S. financial institutions to tell the U.S. government about their U.S.
account holders.01 In general, FATCA applies to payments of investment
200 See IRS, Voluntary Disclosure Questions and Answers, supra note 140, at Question 10
("Those taxpayers making 'quiet' disclosures should be aware of the risk of being examined and
potentially criminally prosecuted for all applicable years.").
201 This Article refers to the statute, codified at I.R.C. §§ 1471-1474 (Supp. 2011), or Chapter 4
of the Code, as "FATCA" although it was not codified as such. The law was proposed by the Obama
administration in the 2010 Greenbook as a modification to the qualified intermediary ("QI") and
nonqualified intermediary ("NQI") rules applicable to payments of U.S.-source investment income to
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income or gain made from the United States to "foreign financial
institutions," or FFIs.20 2 Unless the FFI-including each of its affiliates-
has agreed to obtain and report information about U.S. account holders and
submit to "verification and due diligence procedures,, 203 thirty percent
withholding applies to U.S.-source portfolio income streams and gross
proceeds from the sale of certain securities that produce U.S.-source
portfolio income, regardless of whether those payments are made to U.S.
or non-U.S. accounts at the FFI.2 4 If the FFI has entered into such an
agreement, thirty percent withholding applies only to accounts held by
"recalcitrant account holders" who refuse to provide information necessary
to ascertain whether they are U.S. persons and/or who do not waive bank
secrecy law obstacles to the disclosure of their identity consistent with
FATCA. °5  The law gives the Treasury broad discretion to craft
appropriate agreements and exceptions.20 6
FATCA builds on the precedent of the negotiated development of the
non-U.S. persons. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S
FIScAL YEAR 2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS 41-45 (May 2009). Bills proposing to enact a "Foreign
Account Tax Compliance Act" followed in late 2009. See, e.g., H.R. 3933, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009). Legislation then passed as part of a larger jobs-oriented tax package in March 2010. See Hiring
Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, § 501, 124. Stat. 71 (2010).
202 See I.R.C. § 1471 (describing rules applicable to payments to foreign financial institutions).
Withholding may also apply to payments to other foreign entities. Id. § 1472. The statute provides an
effective date of January 1, 2013, but subsequent guidance indicates that various stages of
implementation will be delayed. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2011-53, 2011-32 I.R.B. 124 (July 15, 2011).
The government promulgated proposed regulations under FATCA as this Article went to press. See
Regulations Relating to Information Reporting by Foreign Financial Institutions and Withholding on
Certain Payments to Foreign Financial Institutions and Other Foreign Entities, 77 Fed. Reg. 9022
(proposed Feb. 15, 2012) [hereinafter "Proposed FATCA Regs"].
203 See id. § 1471(b)(1) (describing agreement requirements); id. § 1471(e) (requiring all affiliates
of a financial institution to enter into the requisite agreement in order for payments to the financial
institution to escape withholding). Subsequent guidance has offered more information about specific
information required to be reported and affiliate reporting, among other matters. See I.R.S. Notice
2011-34, 2011-19 I.R.B. 765 (May 9, 2011) (announcing, explaining, and requesting comments on the
implementation of FATCA); I.R.S. Notice 2010-60, 2010-37 I.R.B. 329 (Sept. 13, 2010) (same).
204 See I.R.C. § 1471(a) (applying thirty percent tax to any "withholdable payment" to a "foreign
financial institution"); id. § 1473(1) (defining "withholdable payment"). The withholding penalty
applies to payments of U.S.-source interest, dividends, rents, royalties, and other payments of passive
or investment income. It also applies-unlike penalty withholding rules under the QI regime-to
"gross proceeds from the sale or other disposition of property of a type which can produce interest or
dividends from sources within the United States." Id. § 1473(l)(A). It does not apply to amounts
connected with a U.S. trade or business. Id. § 1473(l)(B).
25 Id. §§ 1471(b)(1)(D)(i)-(ii) & 1471(d)(6).
206 Some statutory language is quite specific. See, e.g., id. § 1471(c)(1) (requiring the name,
address, and TIN of each U.S. account holder, the account number, the account balance of value and
gross receipts, and gross withdrawals). But discretion is sprinkled throughout the statute and in
particular in § 1471(b)(2)(A), which provides broad authority to the Treasury Secretary to "deem[]"
financial institutions to meet requirements so long as Secretary-prescribed "procedures" and
"requirements" are met. Id. § 147 1(b)(2)(A).
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model qualified intermediary, or QI, agreement, which implemented
rules permitting non-U.S. QI banks to forward non-U.S. client information
to the United States on a summary basis to obtain reduced rates of
withholding on U.S. source payments.20 8 Starting in 1998, the IRS
negotiated with bank trade associations, primarily in Europe, to draft the
Model QI Agreement.20 9 The bank associations extracted some favorable
provisions, including permission to rely on existing know-your-customer,
or KYC, procedures,210 and the provisions described above2 11 that could be
interpreted by banks to permit the retention of a U.S. account holder if the
account holder divested non-U.S. assets.212
FATCA applies to every FFI that holds U.S. securities, not just those
that prefer QI to NQI status. The New York State Bar Association has
pointed out, for example, that "[t]here are no QIs in a number of countries
that represent significant sources of inbound investment to the United
States, including China, Brazil and Mexico" as well as New Zealand; there
are reportedly "very few [QIs] in Japan. ' 213
B. Applying the High-Penalty Analytic Framework to FATCA
It appears at first glance that for any FFI with clients who hold
investments in U.S. securities, FATCA's withholding penalty is so onerous
that it simply must be avoided at all costs. 214 Thirty percent withholding
207 See J. Richard Harvey, Offshore Accounts: Insider's Summary of FA TCA and Its Potential
Future, 57 VILL. L. REv. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 3-14) (describing the origins of FATCA);
see also Melissa A. Dizdarevic, Comment, The FATCA Provisions of the HIRE Act Boldly Going
Where No Withholding Has Gone Before, 79 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2967, 2978-80 (2011) (explaining how
weaknesses in the QI program prompted FATCA); Chad P. Ralston, Comment, Going it Alone: A
Pragmatic Approach to Combating Foreign-Effected Tax Evasion, 24 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 873, 896-
97 (2010) (describing strengths and weaknesses of the QI program).
208 See supra note 149 (outlining QI rules). The government has emphasized its openness to
foreign banks' input and its willingness to listen to their concerns with respect to FATCA. See, e.g.,
Kristen A. Parillo, IRS Official Foresees Release of FATCA Guidance in Stages, TAX NOTES (Apr. 29,
2010), available at LEXIS, Tax Notes library, 2010 TNT 83-2 ("[lt's helpful for institutions to
provide submissions and give us comments telling us what they already do and help us understand what
assurance those measures provide.") (quoting Treasury attorney-advisor Itai Grinberg).
209 See Susan C. Morse & Stephen E. Shay, Qualified Intermediary Status, Act IT. Notice 99-8 and
the Role of a Qualified Intermediary, 28 TAX MGM'T INT'L J. 259, 259-60 (1999) (describing the
process of collecting comments from foreign banks before proposing QI agreement); see also Mamin J.
Michaels et al., Nine Months of Working With the QI Agreement: What Has the IRS Wrought?, 11 J.
INT'L TAX'N 4 (2000).210 See Morse & Shay, supra note 209, at 262 (describing the typical practice of a country's bank
association guiding KYC rules to IRS approval).
211 See supra notes 70-71 (describing provisions relating to the disclosure of U.S. holders'
identity).212 See supra note 149 (identifying holes in QI rules).
213 See NYSBA Sept. 10, 2009 Letter, supra note 149, at 20, 23.
214 See Dizdarevic, supra note 207, at 2985 (noting FATCA's apparent penalty, as opposed to
enforcement, purpose).
CONNECTICUT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 44:675
TAX COMPLIANCE UNDER HIGH-PENAL TY REGIMES
on gross proceeds-that would lose customers fast. A thirty percent
withholding penalty far exceeds any penalty typically prescribed for U.S.
215banks required to report to U.S. customers.
But, in fact, the U.S. government is not-and should not be-generally
216prepared to impose this withholding tax. Doing so could produce
significant unwanted capital market disruptions and require commitment of
international relations resources.
With respect to the capital markets point, there is a zero withholding
tax baseline provided for most returns on U.S.-issued securities held by
non-U.S. investors. In particular, the portfolio interest exemption provides
a zero withholding tax on payments to non-U.S. persons of interest on most
U.S.-issued debt securities, 21 7 while the residence-of-the-seller sourcing
rule for capital gain also takes gain on a non-U.S. person's sale of U.S.-
issued debt and equity securities out of the U.S. income tax base.21 8 The
flow of global capital into U.S. debt and equity markets-including the
market for government-issued debt-rests in part on the assumption that
U.S. withholding tax will apply only in narrow and well-defined cases.
For example, the many-layered provisions of the standardized agreement
used by derivative traders are scrupulously designed to ensure that holders
of derivatives will not see their investment return changed by an
unexpected withholding tax. l9 Imposing FATCA withholding taxes
would disturb the capital markets' expectation of no withholding tax on
most returns on U.S. securities and discourage global investment in U.S.
capital markets.
International relations resources could also be required to smooth
things over. Interestingly, the resolution to the UBS case was announced
at the conclusion of a visit to Switzerland by Secretary of State Hillary
215 No withholding requirement applies to usual-course bank and financial account reporting to
U.S. account holders within the United States. See Lily Kahng, Investment Income Withholding in the
United States and Germany, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 315, 324-26 (2010) (noting the absence of investment
income withholding in the U.S.). Withholding is only required if an account holder repeatedly fails to
pay taxes on income reported from an account. See Treas. Regs. §§ 1.6041-1 (explaining back-up
withholding notices).
216 U.S. government representatives have said that they want "transparency," not withholding, to
result from FATCA. See, e.g., Tom Braithwaite, U.S. Delays Reporting Rules for Foreign Banks, FIN.
TIMES, July 15, 2011 (quoting IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman); Lee Sheppard, Questions Posed by
the FATCA Notice, TAX NOTES (2010), available at LEXIS, Tax Notes library, 2010 TNT 205
(reporting government official's suggestion that a bank might not need to build automatic withholding
into its computer systems but could address any withholding requirements manually).
217 See I.R.C. § 871(h) (2006) (providing "portfolio interest" exemption).
Zig See id § 865(a) (providing default residence-of-seller gain source rule).
219 See INT'L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS'N, MASTER AGREEMENT (1992). Part Two of the
Schedule to the ISDA Master Agreement, executed in connection with specific transactions, generally
includes a representation that no withholding will be due on payments under the derivative agreement,
based on representations about the residence of the recipient and the delivery of certain documentation.
Id.
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Clinton.220  Application of a punitive withholding tax to force client
disclosure would likely also raise significant bank secrecy or other
conflicts that could require diplomatic resources to help resolve. FATCA
rules are simply inconsistent with many local bank secrecy laws. Broadly
enforced withholding tax penalties under FATCA are just not credible,
even if withholding might result in egregious isolated cases.
In addition, jurisdictional limitations constrain the ability of the United
States to detect noncompliant banks that masquerade as compliant
banks.221 The United States may develop audit selection models but will
not be able to apply them directly. In the companion QI context, audit
responsibility is generally delegated to a third-party auditor, frequently a
large accounting firm or an affiliate of such a firm.22  Historic
jurisdictional limitations, now memorialized in the QI agreement, prevent
the IRS from directly accessing the financial institution's records to
perform a direct audit.
It is unclear whether the question of close substitutes presents a
problem. Foreign banks have three options under FATCA: disclose,
withhold, or divest U.S. assets. The withholding penalty does not apply if
a foreign bank divests all U.S. assets and invests solely in non-U.S.
securities, because in this situation no withholdable payments to the
divested foreign bank-whether paid directly from a U.S. withholding
agent or through other FFIs-would exist. The success of FATCA thus
depends on the stickiness of global investment in U.S. securities.
Widespread investment in U.S. government debt and other U.S. securities
throughout the world suggests that non-U.S. banks will have a sufficient
incentive to negotiate with the United States.223 The banks are not entirely
without an alternative, however, and on the margin, some banks might
divest U.S. assets, which could adversely impact U.S. capital markets.224
220 Sue Pleming & Deborah Charles, Clinton Says Agreement "in Principle" with UBS, REUTERS
(July 31, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN3142328120090731 (reporting Hillary Clinton's
announcement of a litigation settlement agreement and her related meeting with the Swiss foreign
minister).
22' Historically, U.S. jurisdiction over non-U.S. banks for the purpose of discovering information
about U.S. tax evasion or other criminal activity allegedly facilitated by such banks has been based on
the physical nexus of a U.S. representative office. See PALAN ET AL., supra note 91, at 198; see also
Burke, supra note 191, at 421-22, 436 (articulating jurisdictional barriers to solving cross-border
compliance problem); Dodge, supra note 11, at 170-77 (explaining historic reluctance under the
revenue rule to enforce other countries' tax laws).222 See Rev. Proc. 2000-12, 2000-1 C.B. 387, 408 § 10 (detailing external audit procedures).
223 In addition, the broad definition attached to "passthru payments" subject to the statute brings
considerable indirect U.S. fund flows under FATCA. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1471; I.R.S. Notice 2011-34,
supra note 203.
224 In response to KPMG survey questions asking whether a fund "could intend to disinvest" from
the U.S. equity market, six percent of the non-U.S. fund managers surveyed answered "yes," and
twenty-six percent replied that it depended on the detailed implementation rules. KPMG, FATCA AND
THE FUNDS INDUSTRY: DEFINING THE PATH 6 (2011), available at www.kpmg.com/
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Another possible close substitute is a shift in U.S. investment from
banks that go along with FATCA's audit requirements in good faith to
banks that do not, for example, banks in jurisdictions with more distant
relationships with the United States. This concern may be mitigated by the
relationships among nations that are established and successful tax havens,
if such established nations that "offer political and legal stability" to
investors 225 decide as a group to go along with FATCA. This would be
consistent with European nations' fairly coordinated action in QI
negotiations and with tax havens' cooperative approach in the face of the
OECD harmful tax practices project.22 6 U.S. investors would then be left
with no sufficiently safe non-FATCA offshore alternative.
There may also be other substitute strategies available under the
statute. The approach of entering into an agreement but accepting
withholding tax imposition on "recalcitrant account holders" provides one
possibility.227 Depending on regulatory guidance, a foreign bank might be
able to enter into an agreement with the United States Treasury
Department, but steer all recalcitrant account holders (presumably all U.S.
228Unetaxpayers) toward investment exclusively in non-U.S. securities. Under
this approach, non-U.S. account holders and U.S. account holders willing
to have their names disclosed could retain their investments in U.S.
securities; only recalcitrant account holders would be required to divest.
The U.S. government cannot remove the substitute of divestiture from
the menu of options available to non-U.S. banks, but this may not be fatal
to FATCA's strategy. The reason is that divestiture is costly; U.S.
securities remain attractive investments for various reasons. Other close
substitutes, such as the possibility of placing U.S. account holders in the
"recalcitrant" category, should be removed if possible. The government is
229aware of at least some of these problems.
C. Administering FATCA with Expressive Law in Mind
Since FATCA does not work as a U.S.-government-enforced high-
Global/en/issuesAndlnsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/fatca-and-the-funds-industry-defining-
the-path.pdf. Some journalistic accounts predict divestiture. See, e.g., David T. Moldenhauer,
Overseas Bank Law Could Drive Away Investment in U.S., FISCAL TIMES (May 12, 2011), available at
www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2011/05/12/Overseas-Bank-Law-Could-Drive-Away-Investment-
in-US.aspx#pagel ("FATCA is proving to be so intrusive and far-reaching that it will likely prompt
many foreign banks and investment companies to abandon the U.S. investment market ... ").
225 Michael J. Burns & James McConvill, Comment, An Unstoppable Force: The Offshore World
in a Modern Global Economy, 7 HASTINGS BuS. L.J. 205, 219 (2011).226 See PALAN ET AL., supra note 91, at 204 (describing actions of the Committee on Fiscal
Affairs of the OECD and its publication of those jurisdictions practicing harmful tax competition).
227 I.R.C. §§ 1471(b)(1)(D), 1471(d)(6).
228 But see I.R.S. Notice 2011-34, supra note 203, at 769 (noting that the Treasury may terminate
FF1 Agreements because of the number of recalcitrant account holders after a certain amount of time).
229 Id.
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penalty regime within the bounds of the rational actor model, and since the
U.S. government has already committed resources to the administration of
FATCA, it makes sense to consider an expressive law strategy. The idea is
to create a norm that prompts reputation-based signaling. This can, in turn,
produce deterrence and separation mechanisms enforced by the reputation
market. If a robust reputation market supports the perceptions that
noncompliance carries reputational penalties and that masquerading
noncompliers will be detected, then it might make the high-penalty
FATCA regime a success even in the absence of effective government
enforcement.
The government could follow an expressive law strategy that includes
the factors outlined above: reputation referencing, salience, management
targeting, and incrementalism. 230  Such a strategy would articulate the
norm in a way that references reputation, perhaps building on the subtext
of "good banks don't lie" conveyed by the OECD's harmful tax practices
project, to develop the message that "good banks tell the truth." It would
maximize the salience of the norm and provide opportunities for targeted
tax intermediaries to show publicly their commitment to the norm. Since
the audience consists of large enterprises, the best expressive law strategy
would target the people at the top, in particular the top compliance officers
that most firms now include in their executive management team.23'
Finally, it would embrace incrementalism, following the theory that
signaling can trigger self-reinforcing virtuous circles that should make it
easier to expand the application of the regime once the underlying norm
has gained a foothold.232
1. Reputation Referencing
A relevant model for reputational signaling in the third-party reporting
context is the Form 1099 reporting regime applicable to domestic
payments made by U.S. financial institutions. The statutes include both
high monetary penalties-up to ten percent of the aggregate amount of the
items required to be reported correctly for intentional disregard 233 -and
230 See supra Section IV.C.2.
231 See supra note 87 and accompanying text (noting chief compliance officer appointments).
232 Signaling can produce virtuous circles because a more widely accepted norm is a stronger
norm and also because signaling should trigger a commitment consistency effect that strengthens the
compliance behavior of the signaler. See supra text accompanying notes 22, 88, 122-24 (describing
potential virtuous-circle effect in connection with expressive law strategy and giving the example of
countries' responses to the OECD's harmful tax practices project).
233 See I.R.C. § 6721 (e) (2006) (providing intentional disregard penalty of ten percent of amount
required to be reported for requirements including the reporting of interest and dividends under § 6041
and penalty of five percent of such amount for requirements including the reporting of gross proceeds
under § 6045). A maximum annual penalty per person of $250,000 is imposed for a corrected failure to
file an information return within thirty days that is not excused under a reasonable cause standard. Id.
§§ 6721(b)(1)(B), 6724(a).
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criminal penalties 234 for failure to file information returns such as the
annual submission of 1099 forms informing investors of the amount of
dividends, interest, gross proceeds, and other payments.235 But these
penalties are almost never applied, particularly to large financial
institutions. So why do such firms uniformly comply with the reporting
requirements?
One possibility is that these firms are subject to regular audit and so
believe that the penalties will be applied if they fail to report. But another
possibility is that large firms are risk-averse with respect to their
reputations and their client relationships. The possible revelation of a
failure to report would carry an enormous penalty, one only partly
contained within the statute and augmented by factors such as the likely
public relations problems resulting from the necessity of, for example,
sending corrected, late information returns to clients. Another related
reputational idea is that the action of reporting carries with it an important
signaling message about the reputation of the reporting firm: "we're a good
bank, our records are accurate, we tell the truth by January 31 every year."
The example of U.S. banks-as well as the U.S. experience of signing
up foreign banks as QIs and the fact that banking tax havens scrambled to
stay off the OECD blacklist-suggests that non-U.S. banks do have
significant reputational interests that a signaling strategy can tap into. And
in fact there is plenty of reputational content and salience in the "good
banks tell the truth" norm that FATCA administrators should advocate.
The trouble, of course, is that "good banks keep their clients' secrets" more
closely resembles the historic bank secrecy-based norm among many non-
U.S. banks.236
One might argue that the clients of U.S. domestic banks value tax
compliance signals from their banks because the clients self-select for
financial institution compliance, while clients of offshore banks self-select
for noncompliance. Under this theory, a tax compliance signal from an
offshore bank will alienate, rather than impress, the offshore bank's clients,
thus causing the reputational signaling strategy to backfire. This is indeed
a risk. If an expressive law strategy is successful, it will almost certainly
234 See id. § 7203 (providing misdemeanor characterization for failure to file information return
and prescribing penalties including up to one year's imprisonment); cf. Pappas v. United States, 216
F.2d 515, 518-19 (10th Cir. 1954) (sustaining jury conviction of partners who failed to supply required
balance sheet and other information on partnership return despite maintaining careful "cash count" and
other records under a predecessor to § 7203).
235 See I.R.C. § 6041(d) (providing that the total amount of payments due to a person must be
reported in a statement); id. § 6041A(e) (providing that the total amount of payments of remuneration
for services and direct sales due to a person must be reported in a statement); id. § 6042(c) (providing
that the total amount of dividends and corporate earnings and profits due to a person must be reported
in a statement).
236 See, e.g., Bondi, supra note 122, at 3-6 (describing historic Swiss commitment to banking
secrecy and connection to Swiss legal rule that tax evasion is a civil, not criminal, offense).
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be because it has successfully associated the notion of tax compliance with
non-tax qualities valued by a bank's clients, such as trustworthiness or
good management. At the national level, the compliance of bank secrecy
tax havens with the demands emerging from the OECD's harmful tax
practices project provides some precedent suggesting that the association
of tax compliance with non-tax reputational values is possible.
2. Salience
The FATCA administration strategy must also include opportunities
for non-U.S. banks and other foreign financial intermediaries to signal their
compliance with the norm. The statute itself offers two such signaling
mechanisms: entry into an agreement between the U.S. government and an
FF1, 237 and annual reporting of the required information. 238  These
mechanisms will be stronger signaling devices if they are public and
simple. Thus the banks who have agreements with the government might
be publicly listed on the IRS website, and the reporting form should be as
streamlined as possible.
A requirement that non-U.S. banks must send FATCA reports to U.S.
account holders as well as to the U.S. government would maximize the
visibility of the banks' compliance action and target the largest group of
potential reputation market participants-the banks' customers. The
statute does not specify whether client reporting is required,239 though IRS
guidance could do so. Non-U.S. banks might oppose client reporting as an
undesirable added administrative burden on top of already challenging
compliance demands, but such a requirement would be consistent with the
expressive law project of FATCA administration.
3. Management Targeting
Because FATCA seeks to influence the reputation signaling behavior
of large institutions, its administration should take into account the
organizational behavior features of large institutions.240 The penalty for
failing to agree or report as required under FATCA does not target top
managers, but instead provides for withholding on particular payments
made to accounts. Yet reputation signaling strategies could target top
management, for example by gathering them at public events related to the
development of FATCA guidance, or by signing FATCA agreements, or
by including information about the top management of a particular firm in
237 I.R.C. § 1471(b).
23
1Id. § 1471(c).
239 The statute does not specify whether account holders will receive reports, see id. § 1471
(requiring simply "reporting"). It would be consistent with domestic 1099 reporting, but inconsistent
with NQI rules, to require forms to be sent to account holders as well.240 See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
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publicity about compliance or noncompliance with FATCA.
4. Incrementalism
Finally, the promise of an incremental expressive law strategy should
inform the details of FATCA implementation. Incrementalism would
suggest starting with the lightest, least intrusive interpretation possible
consistent with the regulatory goals. The United States wants a norm that a
significant number of non-U.S. banks will agree with. After they have
agreed with it, the United States can expand its application. This path
would resemble the connection between the ten-year-old QIINQI rules,
directed at payments of U.S.-source income to offshore accounts held by
non-U.S. residents, and FATCA's attempt to institute automatic reporting
for offshore accounts held by U.S. residents. Since non-U.S. banks are
used to giving some information to the U.S. tax system under the QI/NQI
system, the idea of providing more information under FATCA is not as
distasteful.
For example, one issue under current regulatory guidance is granting
exemptions from FATCA for certain classes of institutions or accounts.
Exemptions may be granted, for example, by classifying an entity as a
deemed-compliant FFI or as an excepted non-foreign financial entity.
Categories likely to be excepted include certain insurance companies (but
perhaps not with respect to whole life policies) and non-U.S. pension
funds, as well as certain local entities.24'
FATCA guidance must also provide due diligence guidelines for FFIs
to determine whether an account is held by a U.S. person. The existing
items of guidance do not always require an FFI to obtain U.S. withholding
forms (which would be a significant departure from current practice), but
they alter the usual withholding agent rule that one may rely facially on
information provided by a payee 242 by requiring further investigation if due
diligence suggests a U.S. link. Such a link might be indicated by various
bits of information, such as a U.S. address listed in almost any connection
with the account.243 If this due diligence indicates U.S. status, the FFI
must investigate further. Less onerous due diligence standards apply for
241 See I.R.S. Notice 2010-60, supra note 203, at 331 (describing entities that would receive
exemptions from the IRS's definition of Financial Institutions); Proposed FATCA Regs, supra note
202, at 9025 (describing expanded categories of "deemed-compliant FFIs," including certain "truly
local entities").
242 Cf Int'l Lotto Fund v. Va. State Lottery Dep't, 800 F. Supp. 337, 342 (E.D. Va. 1992) ("The
role of a withholding agent is ministerial in nature .... The agent is not granted the discretion by the
I.R.S. to conduct an audit-like inquiry upon submission of a properly completed Form 1001.").
243 For example, under the proposed FATCA regs, a U.S. address or telephone number or U.S.
place of birth constitutes "reason to know" that non-U.S. documentation is inaccurate. Prop. Treas.
Reg. 1.1471-3(e)(4), 77 Fed. Reg. 9022, 9069 (proposed Feb. 15, 2012).
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existing accounts.
These due diligence rules illustrate the idea of incremental regulation
nicely. They may not be airtight, especially with respect to pre-existing
accounts. But the more understanding approach is consistent with the idea
that the United States wants to persuade banks to tell it what the banks
know in a minimally invasive way, rather than the prospect that the United
States will require mountains of paper-based historical diligence. Good
banks tell the truth. Good banks should not spend vast resources on
unnecessary paperwork.
Developing FATCA's reporting system will necessarily involve
decisions about cooperation and compromise. The QI experience provides
good examples of this. In particular, it resulted in compromise agreements
to permit reliance on KYC rules to determine account owner identity and
to permit bank secrecy workarounds as alternatives to divulging U.S.
account owner identities. The KYC rules are shaped by concerns about
ferreting out crimes such as money laundering and may not reliably
distinguish accounts held, for example, through shell companies. This
bank secrecy workaround provided an entry point to a number of
avoidance strategies used by UBS and other banks to conceal U.S. clients'
identities or move them to accounts without U.S. securities.2 45 But it also
encouraged many non-U.S. banks to go along with the QI program, which
in turn laid the groundwork for FATCA.
The goal of articulating the least burdensome policy possible,
consistent with the norm that good banks tell the truth, suggests that
exemptions should be fairly broadly granted and due diligence phased in.
But there are contrary considerations. First, granting exemptions and
exceptions raises the possibility of a close-substitutes problem. Second, if
regulated financial institutions perceive a lack of equity in their treatment
versus the treatment of other institutions, they may be less willing to
perceive the norm as fair. Third, regulatees may experience an incremental
solution as unsatisfactory because of a higher degree of uncertainty about
the shape of the final rules. Fourth, layering on additional rules later could
cause additional expense relative to including those rules in the first place.
A partial solution to these problems may be to reserve on and
postpone, rather than definitively exempt, various categories of financial
institutions. This is similar to the approach taken in the administration of
the nonresident withholding regulations that became effective in 2000.
The QI rules, targeted at large foreign banks, came first, for example; the
rules applicable to withholding foreign partnerships and withholding
244 See Proposed FATCA Regs, supra note 202, at 9025 (comparing revised requirements for new
and existing accounts and accounts that meet different value thresholds).
245 See Morse & Shay, supra note 209, at 262-64 (describing the QI agreement's reliance on KYC
rules and the limits of that approach).
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foreign trusts came later.
A separate problem is the possible increased risk of interest group
influence if an incremental regulatory approach is taken. A central tenet of
theories of regulatory capture and public choice is that "regulatory
policies.., benefit narrow interests at the expense of broad interests,
'246
because any member of the public has insufficient reason to care about
small regulatory changes about which regulatees (non-U.S. banks and
other FFIs, in the case of FATCA) care very much. Hence, regulatees
should be expected to exercise disproportionate influence over an
incremental regulatory process. Strong regulatory or bureaucratic cultures
or institutions, however, may reduce the risk of capture. Full consideration
of this tension between the increased capture risks of incrementalism and
its expressive law advantages lies beyond the scope of this Article.
Despite these countervailing factors, viewing the problem through the
expressive law lens makes an incremental approach to FATCA guidance
relatively attractive, under the assumption that persuading non-U.S. banks
of the reputational advantages of FATCA is necessary to gain foothold
acceptance of the norm by countries and/or financial institutions and that it
does not open up a close substitute avenue. Otherwise, the norm may
simply not develop.
D. Seeking Multinational Enforcement
The possibility that FATCA is a stepping stone to a global mechanism
for automatic income tax reporting also deserves mention.247 The limits
that push U.S. administrators away from a government enforcement
solution and toward an expressive law strategy for FATCA are
jurisdictional, particularly the United States' inability to audit banks in
order to detect masquerading noncompliers. Sufficient cooperation with
other governments could solve this jurisdictional problem. For example,
the United States might agree on some kind of mutual audit program under
which the United States would certify U.S. banks as compliant and other
countries would certify their respective non-U.S. banks as compliant.
Both the importance of multinational cooperation to an eventually
successful enforcement strategy and the possible immediate expressive law
reputation and norm-focused strategy should motivate U.S. tax
administrators to find all the help they can get from non-U.S. governments
246 Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 35 (1998).
247 See Grinberg, supra note 188, at 32-54 (emphasizing the importance of an automatic global
reporting system). Diane Ring has considered the possibility that contemporaneous events in a number
of jurisdictions may prompt a growing move toward global information reporting. Diane Ring,
Backdoor Harmonization: Implications of the New Era of Tax Information (June 1,2011) (unpublished
manuscript at 20-21) (on file with author).
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and non-U.S. organizations to communicate FATCA's "good banks tell the
truth" norm and its connection to reputation. This need arises particularly
because the United States has only recently taken the initiative in the
project of increasing tax haven transparency; European countries had
previously carried the project, particularly during the George W. Bush
administration when the U.S. government declined to fully support the
OECD harmful tax practices project.248  U.S. membership in several
consortia seeking to foster multinational cooperation with respect to certain
problems of international tax enforcement may provide some starting
points for such a project.249
Any country whose residents have significant offshore account
holdings has strong fiscal reasons to support the norm that "good banks tell
the truth" (and the related tax principle of residence-based income taxation
for individuals) and they therefore make up a subgroup for whom the norm
would represent a collective action solution. 250  The OECD experience
with the harmful tax practices project suggests that non-U.S. countries
might cooperate in communicating the new norm. Other nations' efforts to
find out about their own residents' offshore account holdings, such as by
demanding disclosure of offshore credit card accounts, 251 purchasing data
from ex-bank employees, 252 and entering into TJEAs,253 provide examples
248 See PALAN ET AL., supra note 91, at 8, 217-18 (describing U.S. policy under the Bush
Administration, which was to not support efforts aimed at challenging negative tax competition).
249 Relevant multinational working groups include the OECD's Treaty Relief and Compliance
Enhancement, or TRACE, project, see OECD, CENTRE FOR TAX POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0,3746,en_2649_33767_45700745_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited
Dec. 16, 2011), and the Joint International Tax Shelter Information Centre, or JITSIC, a collaboration
among the tax agencies of Australia, Canada, China, Japan, the UK, and the U.S., IRS, JOINT INT'L
TAX SHELTER INFO. CTR., http://www.irs.gov/businesses/intemational/article/0,,id=223291,00.html
(last visited Dec. 16, 2011).
250 As this Article went to press, the U.S. government announced an agreement in principle with
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK to accept reporting under FATCA from these nations'
governments and to reciprocate. See U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, JOINT STATEMENT FROM THE UNITED
STATES, FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, SPAIN AND THE UNITED KINGDOM REGARDING AN
INTERGOVERNMENTAL APPROACH TO IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPLIANCE AND
IMPLEMENTING FATCA (Feb. 7, 2012). See generally KEOHANE, supra note 109, at 79 (noting that
governments may form agreements on international regimes in situations that involve "shared interests"
and "dense policy spaces"); SLAUGHTER, supra note 108, at 172-77 (exploring different models of
international regulatory convergence supported by horizontal and cross-border networks of regulators);
Ring, supra note 100, at 684-89 (explaining the "lobbying," "uniting," "diversifying," and
"researching" roles multinational organizations may take).
21 See PALAN ET AL., supra note 91, at 83, 231 (describing U.K. order to Barclays to disclose
offshore credit card information in 2006, and various other countries' attempts "to collect revenue lost
to tax havens").
252 See, e.g., id. at 239-41 (describing "the Liechtenstein debacle"); The Liechtenstein
Connection, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Feb. 16, 2008), http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/business/
0,1518,535768,00.html (reporting on the German government's acquisition of data about Liechtenstein
accounts held by "[a]s many as 900 wealthy Germans-many of them well-known").
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of actions that support the norm that FATCA administrators are attempting
to generate. Likewise, U.S. acquiescence to requests from other countries,
including Mexico, asking the United States to disclose information about
254their residents or citizens would support the FATCA norm.
Of course, a uniform reporting system would be much easier to
implement multilaterally. Multinational cooperation raises the problem of
255reconciling system designs that differ from FATCA, as well as
implementation challenges that would arise whether or not different
nations' systems designs were similar. 6 If today's project of developing
an expressive law strategy to support FATCA successfully morphs into
more familiar government enforcement territory, various system design
changes demanded by other governments may be part of the new
arrangement. But an effort under FATCA to persuade non-U.S. banks that
information reporting is consistent with good reputation signaling should
smooth the way toward implementation of a global reporting system. The
support, or at least the moderation of objection, from financial institutions
in various nations' domestic politics could encourage acceptance of
multilateral enforcement responsibilities as well as the current unilateral
U.S. FATCA effort. In this way, an expressive law strategy could support
effective government enforcement in the long term as well as reputation
market compliance mechanisms in the shorter term.
VIII. CONCLUSION
For the compliance mechanisms of deterrence, separation, and/or
signaling to succeed, a high-penalty regime should feature the three
253 China Signs TIEA With Argentina, CHINA BRIEFING (Dec. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2010/12/16/china-signs-tiea-with-argentina.htm (reporting
China's TIEAs with Argentina, the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, the Isle of Man, Guernsey,
Jersey, and Bermuda).
254 See McIntyre, supra note 124, at 258-59 (expressing "guarded optimism" on the future of
information exchange based in part on the Mexican request for U.S. bank data); Kevin Preslan,
Turnabout is Fair Play: The U.S. Response to Mexico's Request for Bank Account Information, 1
GLOB. BUS. L. REV. 203, 224-26 (2011) (recommending that the U.S. comply with the Mexican
information request and exploring different routes to a solution).
255 One example is the Swiss-proposed solution reportedly named "Project Rubik," which calls for
the imposition by the Swiss government of withholding taxes on undisclosed accounts and the
remittance of the taxes to the governments of the accounts' beneficial owners' residence or citizenship.
Niels Jensen, How to Kill the Scapegoat: Addressing Offshore Tax Evasion with a Special View to
Switzerland, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1823, 1852-55 (2010). A similar confidentiality-preserving approach
has been used, for example, in an agreement struck between Switzerland and the U.K. See Vanessa
Houlder, Britons to be Taxed on Secret Billions, FIN. TIMES, May 2, 2011.256 See OECD, REPORT OF THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE TAXATION OF
COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT VEHICLES AND PROCEDURES FOR TAX RELIEF FOR CROSS-BORDER
INVESTORS ON POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS TO PROCEDURES FOR TAx RELIEF FOR CROSS-BORDER
INVESTORS 16 (2009) (noting three different possible structures for global information reporting).
2012]
CONNECTICUT LA W REVIEW
supports of persuasive penalties, an effective mechanism for detecting
noncompliers who attempt to masquerade as compliers, and a lack of
close-substitute choices. The FBAR offshore account self-reporting
regime could include all of these features, based on government
enforcement. Publicity and audit efforts have enhanced and can continue
to enhance taxpayers' perception of the likelihood of penalty imposition
and noncompliance detection, and it is possible to remove the problematic
close substitute of quiet disclosure on a prospective basis.
If government enforcement cannot provide these three supports for a
high-penalty regime, it may be possible for a robust reputational market to
do so. At the starting point of a historic noncompliance norm, reputational
signaling lacks effect. But an expressive law strategy might generate a
norm that can then support reputational signaling, which can in turn foster
deterrence and separation mechanisms if grounded in a robust reputation
market. The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, which requires non-
U.S. banks to report U.S. account holders to the U.S. government, provides
an example of a situation appropriate for an expressive law strategy.
The U.S. tax administrators enforcing FATCA should articulate a norm
with reputational content; one likely subtext is "good banks tell the truth."
FATCA administrators should seek the endorsement of other countries of
this norm instead of the existing norm of bank secrecy, and avoid
obfuscating the norm with extra paperwork. They should also recognize
the goal of persuading the top management of non-U.S. banks that
adherence to the new norm is a good reputational signal, and should make
the exercise of providing that signal as simple and salient as possible. And
they should consider incremental regulation and compromise in order to
progress the goal of norm development, ideally reserving the possibility of
later expansion. An expressive law approach is the best immediate
strategy for administering FATCA, both because it may persuade non-U.S.
financial institutions that compliance can enhance their reputation and
because it may help persuade other countries to join the project of
developing an enforced, automatic, and global information reporting
system.
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